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I. INTRODUCTION
Stop into any bodega in Brooklyn, New York, and there is sure to be soda
sweetened with corn syrup. 1 In Brooklyn alone, about “139 million gallons of soda
are consumed each year, sweetened by 20,000 acres of corn.” 2 Driving a cab
through his Brooklyn neighborhood of Fifth Ave. and Park Slope, Fray Mendez
reminisces about “Colonial Grape,” the “sweetest grape soda [he] ever drank.” 3 At

1 KING CORN (Mosaic Films, Inc. 2007). In a documentary tracing the overproduction
and subsidization of the corn industry in America, Ian Cheney and Curt Ellis attempt to trace
where the nation’s surplus corn ends up. Id. Cheney and Ellis discover that for each kernel of
corn produced, there is a 70% chance it will end up sweetening a beverage. Id.
2
3

Id.

Id. This soda is also known as “Old Colony Uva”, and high fructose corn syrup is the
second listed ingredient. SAM’S CLUB, http://www.samsclub.com/sams/old-colony-grapesoda-11-27-fl-oz-24-pk/prod10640273.ip (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
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his peak, he drank two liters of the soda each day, maybe more. 4 At that time, Fray
was also over 300 pounds, a size sixty in pants, and completely unaware that
drinking soda was a problem. 5 Although he lost approximately 100 pounds by
eliminating soda from his diet, Fray was recently diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. 6
Unfortunately, he is no stranger to the disease. Fray’s parents and grandmother died
as a direct result of their diabetes and his sister has been a diabetic for years. 7 Fray
recalls the pain his father had in his toe for six months before being diagnosed with
diabetes. 8 He describes how his father had his toe amputated; then his foot, his leg
below the knee, and finally his leg above the knee. 9 When doctors wanted to begin
amputating his other leg, Fray’s father had had enough and gave up. 10
4

KING CORN, supra note 1. A single 11.27 fl. oz. can of Old Colony Uva contains 53 g
of sugar. SAM’S CLUB, supra note 3. Therefore, drinking two liters of the grape soda is
equivalent to consuming 0.70 lbs. of sugar.
5

Id.

6 KING CORN, supra note 1. Type 2 diabetes is a chronic condition that affects the way a
person’s body processes sugar (or glucose). Type 2 Diabetes: Definition, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/type-2-diabetes/DS00585 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
“With type 2 diabetes, [a person’s] body either resists the effects of insulin—a hormone that
regulates the movement of sugar into . . . cells—or doesn’t produce enough insulin to maintain
a normal glucose level.” Id. Because glucose is the body’s main energy source, the inability
of insulin to facilitate glucose’s entry into cells means that those cells are not getting the fuel
they need to properly function. Diabetes Health Center, Causes of Type 2 Diabetes, WEBMD,
http://diabetes.webmd.com/guide/diabetes-causes (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). When glucose
is unable to enter cells, it begins to accumulate in the blood, a condition called hyperglycemia.
NAT’L
INST.
OF
HEALTH,
Type
2
Diabetes,
MEDLINEP LUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000313.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
Diabetes is clinically confirmed by meeting at least two of the following test criteria or
repeating the test on different days: (1) a blood glucose level of at least 126 milligrams per
deciliter after an overnight fast; (2) a non-fasting glucose level greater than or equal to 200
milligrams per deciliter with symptoms of diabetes; (3) a glucose level of at least 200
milligrams per deciliter on a 2-hour glucose tolerance test, or (4) a blood sugar (A1C) test of
at least 6.5%. Diabetes Health Center, supra; see also Type 2 Diabetes: Definition, MAYO
CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/type-2-diabetes/DS00585/DSECTION=tests-anddiagnosis (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
7

KING CORN, supra note 1.

8

Id.

9

Id. Consistently high blood sugar levels can damage nerve fibers throughout the body,
leading to a condition known as diabetic neuropathy. Guido R. Zanni, Diabetic Neuropathy
Symptoms and Treatment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 9, 2013),
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/health-wellness/articles/2013/11/09/diabeticneuropathy-symptoms-and-treatment. Approximately “60 to 70[%] of people with diabetes
have some form of neuropathy,” the most common of which is peripheral neuropathy.
Diabetic Neuropathies: The Nerve Damage of Diabetes, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV’S,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
HEALTH
1
(2009)
http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/dm/pubs/neuropathies/Neuropathies_508.pdf.
Peripheral
neuropathy causes pain or loss of feeling in the peripheral extremities, such as the toes, feet,
and legs. Id. at 3. “Initially, it affects the foot” and “eventually spreads to the ankle and leg.”
Zanni, supra note 9. Because of nerve damage, patients do not feel pain and may be unaware
of foot injuries, resulting in open sores. Id. These open sores may then become infected and
in the most severe cases, lead to amputation of the toes or foot. Id. The natural progression of
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Fray’s story is a stark reality for many Americans, as we have become a society
that walks less and eats more. As a culture, we have decreased the importance of
physical activity, while simultaneously creating an unhealthy food environment. 11
Unfortunately for Fray, he may be without a legal remedy to sue to the makers of his
favorite grape soda. Judicially created thresholds of admissibility for scientific
evidence have made it increasingly difficult for food plaintiffs 12 to prove that a
certain food ingredient, such as high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), caused their type 2
diabetes.
Because obesity and its associated health problems have been largely attributed
to poor self-control, laziness, and various other personal failings, society has been
unwilling to assign blame to food manufacturers for their role in contributing to this
problem. But, as consumers are becoming more aware of the significantly harmful
effect that poor diets can have on a person’s heath, the scales may be tipping in favor
of bringing “Big Food” 13 to court.
Food manufacturers, however, are not exactly vulnerable. Armed with precedent
disputing the causal link between consumption of fast food and adverse health
effects, 14 judicially-created barriers to admitting epidemiologic evidence, 15 and the
defense of personal responsibility, 16 food plaintiffs face an uphill battle.
This Comment explores that reality. It examines the various challenges that
consumers face in holding food manufacturers liable for the dietary impact allegedly
causing obesity-related health conditions. Part I briefly traces the emergence of
HFCS in America’s food supply and examines its possible role in the development
of type 2 diabetes. It discusses previous litigation against the food industry for
diabetic neuropathy is irreversible loss of sensation in the feet, “leading to ulceration and/or
amputation in 15[%] of patients.” Oskar Aszmann, Patsy L. Tassler & A. Lee Dellon,
Changing the Natural History of Diabetic Neuropathy: Incidence of Ulcer/Amputation in the
Contralateral Limb of Patients with a Unilateral Nerve Decompression Procedure, 53
ANNALS OF P LASTIC SURGERY 517, 517 (2004).
10

KING CORN, supra note 1.

11 See generally KELLY D. BROWNELL, FOOD FIGHT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FOOD
INDUSTRY, AMERICA’S OBESITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 8–9 (McGraw-Hill
2004). Scientists, James Hill and John Peters argue “the current epidemic of obesity is largely
caused by an environment that promotes excessive foot intake and discourages physical
activity.” James O. Hill & John C. Peters, Environmental Contributions to the Obesity
Epidemic, 280 SCIENCE, 1371, 1371–74 (1998). Consequently, it is unsurprising that
America’s children are consuming record amounts of fat, sugar, and fast food. BROWNELL,
supra, at 11.
12 This Comment uses the phrase “food plaintiffs” to generally refer to litigants who bring
lawsuits against food manufacturers for allegedly causing their obesity related health
conditions.
13 Defined as the “‘large food companies and legacy brands on which millions of
consumers have relied on for so long.’” Phil Wahba, Campbell Soup CEO Says Distrust of
(Feb.
18,
2015),
‘Big
Food’
a
Growing
Problem,
FORTUNE
http://time.com/3714572/campbell-soup-ceo-says-distrust-of-big-food-a-growing-problem/.
14

See infra Part II.B.

15

See infra Part IV.A.

16

See infra Part II.B.
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allegedly causing obesity and associated health conditions; the Comment then
describes a recent lawsuit targeting manufacturers of HFCS for allegedly causing a
young girl’s type 2 diabetes. Part II highlights epidemiology’s role in demonstrating
causation in product liability suits. Part III examines the current standard of
admissibility for epidemiologic evidence in products liability cases after Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 17 Additionally, it discusses how various courts
have construed Daubert as authorizing the creation of judge-made quantitative
thresholds for admitting epidemiologic evidence. 18 Part IV proposes that these
judicially created standards be abandoned and suggests alternative criteria for
evaluating the reliability of an epidemiologic study offered into evidence. Part V
discusses various conduct-based defenses: assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and comparative fault, which limit food manufacturers’ liability. Part VI
explores the potential for market share liability to provide food plaintiffs a remedy
by relaxing the burden of proving causation. Finally, Part VII highlights legislative
attempts to curb food and beverage litigation, policy concerns, and the future of
lawsuits targeting Big Food.
II. A RECENT LAWSUIT LINKING HFCS CONSUMPTION TO DIABETES IS REMINISCENT
OF PELMAN V. MCDONALD’S CORP.
In 1971, Japanese food scientists discovered a way to produce a sweetener
cheaper than sugar called high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). 19 HFCS is six times
sweeter than cane sugar and could be made from corn. 20 This was a boon to the corn
industry, whose production rose to an all-time high in the mid-1970s. 21 HFCS was
economically produced from the huge surplus of corn grown by American farmers
and thus significantly decreased the production costs of high-sugar products. 22
Initially, no warnings were raised about the significantly different metabolic path
fructose takes in the human body. 23 Whereas sucrose—or regular table sugar—is
17

Daubert v. Merril Dow. Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

18

See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.

19 GREG CRISTER, FAT LAND: HOW AMERICANS BECAME
WORLD 10 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2003).

THE

FATTEST PEOPLE

IN THE

20

Id. When commercial production of HFCS first began in 1967, its fructose content was
approximately 15%. Lee S. Gross, Li Li, Earl S. Ford & Simin Liu, Increased Consumption
of Refined Carbohydrates and the Epidemic of Type 2 Diabetes in the United States: An
Ecologic Assessment, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 774, 777 (2004). After several
modifications that altered the proportion of fructose in HFCS, various food and beverage
manufacturers began using HFCS sweeteners with greater fructose content. Id. For example,
HFCS with a 55% fructose content was used as the sweetener of the soft drink and ice cream
industries. Id. Additionally, HFCS with a 90% fructose content “became a frequent choice
for use in ‘natural’ and ‘light’ foods.” Id.
21

CRISTER, supra note 19, at 10.

22

Id.

23

Id. The digestive and absorptive processes are different for glucose–formed from the
cleavage of sucrose–and fructose. George A. Bray, Samara Joy Nielsen & Barry M. Popkin,
Consumption of High-Fructose Corn Syrup in Beverages May Play a Role in the Epidemic of
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chemically broken down before arriving in the liver, fructose bypasses this process
and arrives in the liver almost completely intact. 24 Although this feature of fructose,
termed “metabolic shunting,” raised concern among food scientists, governmental
bodies such as the USDA, did not explore the issue in depth. 25
Eventually, as mass production techniques made HFCS more readily available to
food manufacturers, HFCS found its way into a wide assortment of foods: as a
substitute for sucrose in carbonated drinks, candy, baked goods, canned fruits, and
even dairy products. 26 Because of its unique chemical attributes, HFCS could be
used in frozen foods to prevent freezer burn and in baked goods to enhance their
natural appearance. 27 Indeed, corn syrup sweeteners now comprise greater than 20%
of total daily carbohydrate intake, an increase of greater than 2100% since the
beginning of the century. 28
A. The Possible Link Between HFCS and Global Diabetes Prevalence
Increasing scientific evidence lends support to the hypothesis that fructose
consumption increases diabetes risk. 29 The increasing global prevalence of obesity
and type 2 diabetes mirrors the worldwide increase in consumption of processed,
Western style foods. 30 The increased availability and consumption of HFCS-

Obesity, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 537, 538 (2004). Glucose and fructose are absorbed
in different segments of the small intestine and once absorbed, are transported to the liver
where the fructose can be converted to glucose or passed into circulation. Id. Addition of
small amounts of fructose can help modulate liver metabolism. Id. However, ingestion of
large amounts of fructose can potentially provide an unregulated source of precursors for fat
synthesis in the liver. Id.
24 CRISTER, supra note 19, at 11 (“Fructose, unlike sucrose . . . took a decidedly different
route into the human metabolism. Where the latter would go through a complex break down
process before arriving in the human liver, the former, for some reason, bypassed that
breakdown and arrived almost completely intact in the liver . . . . ”).
25

Id.

26

Id. at 10, 138; Bray et al., supra note 23, at 540.

27

CRISTER, supra note 19, at 10.

28

Gross et al., supra note 20, at 775–76.

29

Michael I. Goran et al., High Fructose Corn Syrup and Diabetes Prevalence: A Global
Perspective, 8 GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 1, 56 (2012). Using a multivariate nutrient-density
model, researchers found that corn syrup consumption was positively associated with the
prevalence of type 2 diabetes after controlling for total energy, fiber, fat, and protein intake.
Gross et al., supra note 20, at 775. There has been a study, however, which found no
association between HFCS and adverse health consequences. James M. Rippe & Theodore J.
Angelopoulos, Sucrose, High-Fructose Corn Syrup, and Fructose, Their Metabolism and
Potential Health Effects: What Do We Really Know?, 4 ADVANCES IN NUTRITION 236, 242
(2013) (concluding that “there is no unique relationship between HFCS and obesity.”).
However, the findings of that particular study are questionable in light of the researcher’s
conflict of interest. Id. at 236 n. 2 (“[Rippe’s] consulting fees [are] from ConAgra Foods,
Pepsi Co International, Kraft Foods, the Corn Refiners Association, and Weigh Watchers
International.”).
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sweetened beverages is of particular concern because it provides an “an easy vehicle
for excessive sugar intake.” 31
Amid increasing public health alarm at the “concurrent global epidemics” of
obesity and type 2 diabetes, scientists began investigating the possible link between
consumption of HFCS and the global rise in the prevalence of diabetes. 32
Researchers found that countries utilizing HFCS in their food supply as an
alternative sweetener had a diabetes prevalence rate approximately 20% higher than
in countries where HFCS is not used. 33
B. The Latest Battle in the Fight Against Big Food
On June 17, 2013, a lawsuit was filed in a New York District Court on behalf of
a fourteen-year-old girl claiming that HFCS caused her type 2 diabetes. 34 This novel
suit sought to hold HFCS manufacturers strictly liable for creating an unreasonably
dangerous product, without warning consumers of its potential adverse health
consequences, which include development of type 2 diabetes. 35 The complaint
alleged that defendants “knew or should have known that HFCS was a cause of type
of diabetes” and deliberately concealed this fact. 36 The plaintiff also claimed that the
defendants were negligent “in their marketing, distribution, warning, testing and
instructions to . . . consumers of the risks associated with the consumption of their
product.” 37 As a result of the defendants’ actions, the plaintiff sought five million
dollars in damages for her injuries, which included the development of “type 2
30 Goran et al., supra note 29, at 1 (citing Barry M. Popkin & Penny Gordon-Larsen The
Nutrition Transition: Worldwide Obesity Dynamics and Their Determinants, 28 INT’L J.
OBESITY & RELATED METABOLIC DISORDERS S1, S2–S9 (3 Supp. 2004); but see Rippe &
Angelopoulos, supra note 29, at 242 (noting epidemics of diabetes and obesity in countries
where little or no HFCS is available, such as Mexico, Australia, and Europe).
31

Goran et al., supra note 29, at 1.

32

Id. Research conducted by Bray et al. showed that the increase in the consumption of
HFCS preceded the rapid increase in obesity prevalence. Bray et al., supra note 23, at 542.
Similarly, the concurrent rise of HFCS in the nation’s food supply and rates of obesity have
led to the notion that consumption of HFCS sweetened soft drinks caused or contributed to
childhood obesity. R.E. Morgan, Does Consumption of High-Fructose Corn Syrup Beverages
Cause Obesity in Children?, 8 PEDIATRIC OBESITY 249, 249–50 (2013). However, a literature
review of the available research investigating this specific relationship concluded that the
causal mechanism behind childhood obesity is complex and therefore, increased rates of
obesity should not be solely attributed to consumption of HFCS beverages. Id. at 252.
33 Goran et al., supra note 29, at 5. Using data on food availability for forty-three
countries, researchers compared diabetes estimates between countries that were HFCS users
and those that were non-users, adjusting for country-based estimates of body mass index (an
indicator of obesity). Id. at 3. The study revealed that all indicators for diabetes were higher
in countries that used HFCS than those that did not. Id.
34

Complaint at 2, S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 1:13-cv-00634-WMS
(W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2013).
35

See id. at 10–13.

36

Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

37

Id.
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diabetes, loss of enjoyment of life, pain and suffering, emotional distress . . . and
lifelong and permanent medical complications[,] including the probability of surgery
and shortened life expectancy.” 38 The court ultimately dismissed plaintiff’s claims,
noting that she offered “limited facts” to demonstrate that her consumption of foods
containing HFCS—specifically HFCS manufactured by defendants—“over the
course of her life[,] was a substantial factor in causing her [disease].” 39
This latest lawsuit is not the first time the food industry has been blamed for
causing negative health outcomes. 40 In Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 41 two obese
teenage girls took the fast food giant to court. 42 The girls claimed that, as a result of
38

Id. at 15.

39 S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 13-cv-634S, 2014 WL 1600414, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2014). The court observed that the “‘mere possibility of . . . causation is
not enough.’” Id. (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971)). Thus,
“[i]t may be possible that HFCS caused Plaintiff to develop [t]ype 2 diabetes, but [based upon
the facts alleged] is it plausible?” Id. (emphasis added).
40 In 2002, Caesar Barber, a fifty-six-year-old man who was 270 pounds and five-foot-teninches tall, brought a class action lawsuit against the fast food giants: McDonald’s
Corporation, Burger King Corporation, KFC Corporation, and Wendy’s International, Inc.
Complaint of Caesar Barber v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 23145/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); see
also Geraldine Sealey, Obese Man Sues Fast-Food Chains, ABC NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=91427&page=1 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
His
complaint alleged that the fast food manufacturer’s products, which were high in fat, salt,
sugar, and cholesterol, contributed to his obesity. Complaint, Barber, No. 23145/2002, at 9–
10. Moreover, Mr. Barber claimed the defendants did not disclose the ingredients of their
food or adequately warn consumers that ingestion of its products are known to cause “obesity,
diabetes, coronary heart disease, high blood pressure, elevated cholesterol intake, [and] related
cancers . . . ” Id. (“Barber’s lawsuit is the first broad-based action taken against the fast food
industry for allegedly contributing to obesity. [Barber] claims the fast food restaurants, where
[he] says he used to eat four or five times a week even after suffering a heart attack, did not
properly disclose the ingredients of their food and the risks of eating too much.”). Mr.
Barber’s attorney ultimately withdrew the case to pursue the potentially “ground-breaking”
case, Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. Saul Wilensky & Kerry C. O’Dell, Where’s the Beef?–
LAW,
The
Challenges
of
Obesity
Lawsuits,
BLOOMBERG
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/wheres-the-beef-the-challenges-ofobesity-lawsuits/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“Barber’s attorney withdrew the case to pursue
Pelman v. McDonald’s Corporation, a class action with greater potential since, arguably,
child plaintiff’s would not be accountable for their choices of food. Pelman was expected to
be ground-breaking litigation that would purportedly expose industry documents, which, in
turn, could be used to bring a flood of litigation against ‘Big Food.’”).
41

Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

42 The plaintiffs were fourteen-year-old Ashley Pelman, who was four-feet-ten-inches tall
and weighed 170 pounds, and nineteen-year-old Jazlyn Bradley, who was five-feet-six-inches
tall and weighed 270 pounds. FRANCINE R. KAUFMAN, DIABESITY: THE OBESITY-DIABETES
EPIDEMIC THAT THREATENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE MUST DO TO STOP IT 218 (2005).
Using a person’s height and weight, body mass index (BMI) provides an indirect measure of a
person’s body fat. About BMI for Adults, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_BMI/. According to
BMI categories, persons with BMI greater than 25 are considered overweight and those with a
BMI over 30 are classified as obese. Id. According to her BMI of 35.5, Ashley Pelman was
considered obese. Calculate Your Body Mass Index, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/BMI/bmicalc.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
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their consumption of McDonald’s fast food products, they became overweight,
developed diabetes, coronary heart disease, high blood pressure and cholesterol
levels, and other detrimental health effects. 43
The girls claimed that the food giant engaged in deceptive marketing and selling
practices that caused them to “injure their health by becoming obese.” 44 Their
complaint alleged that McDonald’s failed to adequately disclose the health effects of
ingesting certain food items with high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar and
that it engaged in marketing designed to entice customers to purchase “value meals”
without disclosing the potential negative health effects of consumption. 45
Although obesity means having a BMI greater than or equal to 30, morbid obesity begins at a
BMI of 40. Daniel J. DeNoon, Morbid Obesity Bulge Gets Bigger, WEBMD (Apr. 9, 2007),
http://www.webmd.com/diet/news/20070409/morbid-obesity-bulge-gets-bigger. Under this
classification, Jazlyn Bradley, who had a BMI of 43.6, was considered morbidly obese. Id.
Jazlyn’s BMI places her “at greater risk for illnesses including diabetes, high blood pressure,
sleep apnea, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), gallstones, osteoarthritis, heart disease,
and
cancer.”
What
is
Morbid
Obesity?,
U.ROCHESTER MED. CTR.,
http://www.urmc.rochester.edu/highland/departments-centers/bariatrics/right-for-you/morbidobesity.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
43 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 519. Since she was five years old, Ashley had consumed
Happy Meals and Big Macs three to four times a week. KAUFMAN, supra note 42, at 218.
Jazlyn, a more avid consumer, ate at McDonald’s for both breakfast and lunch, and sometimes
after school. Id. Generally, she ordered whole meals each visit, consisting of a Big Mac,
Chicken McNuggets, or fried fish sandwich, in addition to fries, soda or a dessert. Id.
44

Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 516. The plaintiffs in Pelman were not the last to accuse
McDonald’s of deceptive practices that violated consumer protection laws. Ashley Post,
Class Action Lawsuit Against McDonald’s Attacks Marketing to Children,
INSIDECOUNSEL.COM. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/03/01/class-actionlawsuit-against-mcdonalds-attacks-marketing-to-children?t=litigation&page=3. In December
2010, a California mother of two, Monet Parham, filed a class action lawsuit against
McDonald’s Corp., alleging that marketing Happy Meals to children violated consumer
protection laws. Id. According to Parham’s complaint, “McDonald’s exploit[ed] very young .
. . children and harm[ed] their health by advertising unhealthy Happy Meals with toys directly
to them.” Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Unfair Competition Law,
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act & Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Parham v.
McDonald’s Corp., No. 10-506178 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Apr. 4, 2014).
Because young children “do not have the cognitive skills and developmental maturity” to
comprehend McDonald’s persuasive marketing techniques, its use of toys to “bait” children
was “inherently deceptive” and violated state law. Id. In April 2012, however, Parham’s
claims were dismissed without leave to amend. Order Sustaining McDonald’s Demurrers to
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 2, Parham v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 10-506178 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco County Apr. 4, 2014). Although viewed by some critics as
frivolous, Parham v. McDonald’s Corp. “reflects a national focus on health, and imminent
industry wide marketing and product reform.” Post, supra.
45 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
Class action lawsuits for alleged violations of
consumer protection statutes may be the best approach to encourage the food industry to
improve the nutritional content of its product and to change its marketing strategies. Jess
Alderman & Richard A. Daynard, Applying Lessons from Tobacco Litigation to Obesity
Lawsuits, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 82, 87 (2006). This is likely because “[c]onsumer
protection statutes make it easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate a link between corporate
behavior . . . and the public’s direct losses . . . because most do not require a showing that the
defendant’s misbehavior caused a specific illness.” Id. at 85. A similar approach was
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Plaintiffs also accused McDonald’s of negligence, arguing that the food giant
sold food products high in cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar when studies showed that
consumption of such foods caused obesity and other adverse health consequences. 46
The complaint further alleged that McDonald’s failed to warn customers of the
nutritional content and specific ingredients of its food products. 47
In dismissing each of the plaintiffs’ claims, the court provided a roadmap for
future food industry lawsuits. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs failed
to establish that McDonald’s produced a product with dangerous attributes that were
outside the common knowledge of the reasonable consumer. 48 The court
acknowledged the well-known fact that fast food, particularly McDonald’s fast food
products, contained high levels of fat, cholesterol, salt, and sugar and that these
ingredients were deleterious to one’s health. 49 As long as consumers knowledgably
exercise their free choice, manufacturers will not face liability. 50 The court found
that plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint that their choice to eat McDonald’s
successfully used by plaintiffs against tobacco companies. See Aspinall v. Phillip Morris, Co.,
No. Civ.A. 98-6002, 2006 WL 2971490, at *1 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 9, 2006) (holding that
Philip Morris engaged in deceptive business practices when it used the descriptors “light” and
“lowered tar and nicotine” in the marketing of their cigarettes); but see Price v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 54 (Ill. 2005) (overturning $10 billion jury award for plaintiffs by finding
that Philip Morris’ use of the terms “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” were not a violation
of the Consumer Fraud Act because their use was specifically authorized by the Federal Trade
Commission.).
46

Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

47

Id. In a negligent failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the danger was not
obvious to the average consumer; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended
use; (3) the plaintiff’s obesity was caused by the food product; and (4) the harm would not
have occurred if a warning had been given. Michelle M. Mello, Eric B. Rimm & David M.
Studdert, The McLawsuit: The Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability for Obesity, 22
HEALTH AFFAIRS 207, 208–09 (2003) (citing Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 540–41); see
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998). In their amended
complaint, the plaintiffs in Pelman re-alleged negligence by McDonald’s because of its failure
to warn plaintiffs of the dangers of eating processed foods from McDonald’s, but dropped this
cause of action right before oral argument. Amended Complaint, Pelman v. McDonald’s
Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821(RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2003); Pelman ex rel. Pelman v.
McDonald’s Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821(RWS), 2003 WL 22052778, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
2003) (“Shortly before oral argument . . . plaintiffs informed the Court that they [were]
dropping their fourth cause of action, which alleged negligence by McDonald’s because of its
failure to warn plaintiffs of the dangers and adverse health effects of eating processed foods
from McDonald’s.”).
48 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
For a product to be considered unreasonably
dangerous, “the article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
402A cmt. i (1965).
49
50

Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 532.

Id. at 533 (“As long as a consumer exercises free choice with appropriate knowledge,
liability for negligence will not attach to a manufacturer. It is only when that free choice
becomes but a chimera—for instance, by the masking of information necessary to make the
choice . . . that manufacturers should be held accountable.”).
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“several times a week [was] anything but a choice freely made” and that their
decisions could not now be attributed to McDonald’s. 51
Another hurdle that the Pelman plaintiffs faced was establishing that their
particular health problems were proximately caused by consumption of McDonald’s
fast food products. 52 In order for a plaintiff to prove proximate cause, he or she must
demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm. 53 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish proximate cause
because it is “impossible as a matter of law” to blame a particular fast food
establishment for causing their obesity when the plaintiffs were possibly consuming
other unhealthy foods, may or may not have engaged in regular physical activity, and
when their weights could have been influenced by other genetic or environmental
factors. 54
In dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of proximate cause, the court
provided guidance on how future plaintiff could survive a motion to dismiss. First, a
complaint “must establish that the plaintiffs ate at McDonald’s on a sufficient
number of occasions such that a question of fact is raised as to whether McDonald’s
products played a significant role in the plaintiff’s health problems.” 55 Second, in
order to allege that consumption of McDonald’s products was a substantial factor in
causing a plaintiff’s health problems, the complaint must eliminate, or at least
address, the factors, other than diet, that might cause or contribute to obesity and
other health problems. 56
51

Id.

52

Id. at 537.

53 Id. In addition to the substantial factor test, demonstrating that the consumption of fast
food causes to adverse health effects requires two additional proofs. Mello et al., supra note
47, at 209. First, plaintiffs must establish the association between obesity and specific
negative health consequences and then, convince the court that if adequate warnings have
been provided, “the plaintiffs could have avoided the health problems for which they blame
the manufacturer.” Id. at 10.
54 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 537, n.27.
For additional information on factors
contributing to obesity, see Obesity Causes, HARVARD SCH. PUB. HEALTH,
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-prevention-source/obesity-causes/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2015).
55

Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 538–39. For instance, the larger the number of McDonald’s
meals consumed, the greater the likelihood that its products were a substantial factor in
adversely affecting plaintiffs’ health. Id. at 539.
56 Id. (citing Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation, and Treatment of
Overweight and Obesity in Adults, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Sept. 1998),
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_gdlns.pdf
(“Obesity
is
a
complex
multifactorial chronic disease that develops from an interaction of genotype and the
environment. Our understanding of how and why obesity develops is incomplete, but
involves the integration of social, behavioral, cultural, physiological, metabolic and genetic
factors.”)). The federal Food and Drug Administration also acknowledges that “[t]he problem
of obesity in America has no single cause. Rather [it] is the result of multiple factors acting
together over time.” Calories Count: Report of the Working Group on Obesity, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Nov.
10,
2011),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/ConsumerBehaviorResearch/ucm081770.htm
.
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III. USING EPIDEMILOGIC EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH CAUSATION IN PRODUCT
LIABILITY CASES
Generally, causation is established when a plaintiff can demonstrate a nexus
between a defendant’s wrongful conduct and her injury. 57 The traditional “but for”
test of actual causation, commonly employed by most jurisdictions, “illustrates the
‘cause and effect’ relationship between an event and a consequence.” 58 The test
recognizes that a defendant’s actions are responsible for a plaintiff’s injuries if the
harm “would not have occurred in the absence of the defendant’s conduct.” 59
Although the application of the “but for” test resolves most causation issues in tort
law, the test presumes the existence of only a single causative factor. 60
Direct traceability is difficult to establish, however, when multiple factors may
have played a role in bringing about a single injury. To prevent negligent defendants
from escaping liability by pointing to other potential causes for the plaintiff’s injury,
courts developed the “substantial factor” test for multiple causation scenarios. 61
Under this test, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant’s actions were a substantial
factor in bringing about her harm. 62 Thus, in order to prevail against HFCS
manufacturers under a negligence theory, the plaintiff must establish a causal link
between consumption of the defendant’s products and the development of type 2
diabetes. Notably, the plaintiff need not show that her consumption of HFCS was
the sole cause of her diabetes, only that it played a substantial role in the

57

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984).

58

Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Philosophical
View of Proof and Certainty in Uncertain Disciplines, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 875, 876 (2002).
59 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 186 (2d
ed. 2011) (“Under the but-for test, the defendant’s conduct is a factual cause of the plaintiff’s
harm if, but-for the defendant’s conduct, that harm would not have occurred.”).
60

Conway-Jones, supra note 58, at 888. Another problem with the traditional “but for”
test is that it “can be applied only by comparing what happened with a hypothetical alternative
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 59, at § 187. This requires the fact finder to imagine an alternative
series of events that would have occurred had the defendant not acted negligently. Id. Thus,
the determination of factual cause will be based on speculation “about whether the injury
really could have been avoided if the defendant had not been negligent.” Id.
61

Conway-Jones, supra note 58, at 889; Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 425 (7th
Cir. 1992) (“[T]he purpose . . . of the substantial factor test . . . is aimed at alleviating the
inequities that result when applying the but-for test in a multi-defendant case, not at creating
such inequities.”). Id.
62

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
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development of her disease. 63 To demonstrate causation, a plaintiff usually presents
epidemiologic evidence “as the basis of an expert’s opinion on causation.” 64
Epidemiology is the “study of the distribution and determinants of health related .
. . events in specified populations, and the application of this study to control of
health problems.” 65 The goal of epidemiologic research is to quantify the causal
relationship between a certain exposure and disease. 66 A two-step process is often
followed when evaluating epidemiological evidence. 67 First, researchers determine
whether there is an association between an exposure and a particular outcome by
conducting studies of group (ecological studies) and individual characteristics
(cohort and case-control studies). 68 Next, if an association is found, researchers
evaluate whether the observed relationship is a causal one. 69
Epidemiological studies are increasingly used as a method for demonstrating
risks to population groups from various products or practices. 70 This discipline
63

See id. The “substantial factor test is not a comparative test in which the jury assesses
all contributing causes and determines which ones are substantial.” Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 424.
Instead, the test is whether each contributing cause, by itself, is a substantial factor in causing
the injury. Id. at 424–25 (citing Lipke v. Celotex Corp., 505 N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987)).
64 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 551 (3d ed. 2011)
(“Judges and juries are regularly presented with epidemiologic evidence as the basis of an
expert’s opinion on causation. In the courtroom, epidemiologic research findings are offered
to establish or dispute whether exposure to an agent caused a harmful effect or disease.”).
65

JOHN M. LAST, A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 62 (4th ed. 2001).

66 DAVID A. SAVITZ, INTERPRETING EPIDEMIOLOGIC EVIDENCE: STRATEGIES FOR STUDY
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 9 (2003); see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 552
(“Epidemiologic evidence identifies agents that are associated with an increased risk of
disease in groups of individuals, quantifies the amount of excess disease that is associated
with an agent, and provides a profile of the type of individual who is likely to contract a
disease after exposed to an agent.”).
67

LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 204 (3d ed. 2004).

68

Id.

69 Id.
A demonstrated association between a risk factor and disease is attributed to
“chance, bias, confounding, and/or causality.” The Role of Epidemiology in Decision-Making,
THE ANAPOLIS CENTER (1999), http://www.accp1.org/pdf/EpidemiologyInDecision.pdf.
Using various study designs, epidemiologists strive to “reduce the influence of the first three
[factors], leaving cause as the most likely explanation of the demonstrated association.” Id.
Even if an association is found, the inability of an investigator to reduce or at least account
for, the effect of chance, confounding, and bias will deem the study’s results of little value
towards establishing causation. Id.
70 See In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998)
(“Epidemiology is the best evidence of causation in the mass torts context.”). In In re Breast
Implant Litigation, plaintiffs asserted tort claims of negligence and strict liability against
various breast implant manufacturers alleging that their silicone breast implants caused
various autoimmune diseases. Id. at 1221. The court noted that, without a controlled
epidemiologic study, there would be no way to determine whether autoimmune diseases “are
more common in women with silicone breast implants than women without implants.” Id. at
1224. Thus, these studies were deemed necessary to determine causation. Id.; Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[S]peculation unconfirmed by
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attained prominence in toxic tort cases where causation was in dispute because toxic
tort injuries can remain latent for many years. 71
Indeed, the difficulty of proving causation is a major difference between toxic
tort and ordinary personal injury cases. 72 Whereas a single product or incident
causes an identifiable harm in personal injury suits, disease resulting from long-term
exposure to a chemical is not directly observable and may not provide any physical
evidence of the causative agent. 73 Because plaintiffs must offer epidemiologic
evidence to establish the requisite causal link between an exposure and disease
outcome, factfinders must understand what the discipline can, and more importantly,
cannot prove. 74
IV. THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO PROVE CAUSATION UNDER DAUBERT AND
ITS PROGENY
The current standard of admissibility for expert testimony was first outlined in
the leading case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 75 In Daubert, two
children alleged that their serious birth defects were caused by their mothers’
prenatal ingestion of the anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, marketed by Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Dow). 76 Dow’s expert, a physician and epidemiologist,
epidemiologic proof cannot form the basis for causation in a court of law.”). The infamous
“tobacco cases” also highlighted the use of epidemiologic evidence to establish causation in
personal injury lawsuits. In these cases, plaintiffs attempted to use scientific evidence to
demonstrate the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. For example, in Pritchard v.
Liggette & Myers Tobacco Co., the plaintiff introduced several expert witnesses each of
whom testified that the plaintiff’s lung cancer was caused by smoking. Pritchard v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 294, 299–300 (3d Cir. 1961). The appellate court found
that the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to submit the issue of causation to the jury. Id. at
295.
71 Steve C. Gold, Revisting Relative Risk Rules: Garza, Blanchard, and the Ever Evolving
Role of Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Cases, 27 TOXICS LAW REPORTER 49, 49 (2012);
see Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[E]pidemiology is
the best evidence of general causation in a toxic tort case.”).
72 Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 379 (1986).
73

Id.

74 Michael Dore, A Proposed Standard for Evaluating the Use of Epidemiological
Evidence in Toxic Tort and other Personal Injury Cases, 28 HOW. L.J. 677, 683 (1985); see,
e.g., Brock, 874 F.2d at 313 (“We find . . . the lack of conclusive epidemiological proof to be
fatal to the Brock’s case. While we do not hold that epidemiologic proof is a necessary
element in all toxic tort cases, it is certainly a very important element.”).
75 Some consider the three U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), as the “trilogy” of cases that reflect the
current standard on the admissibility of expert testimony. See generally Margaret A. Berger,
The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 10, 10–20 (2d ed. 2000).
76

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 581.
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reviewed more than thirty published studies on Bendectin and birth defects,
containing over 130,000 patients, none of which found that Bendectin was capable
of causing human malformations. 77 Based on these reviews, Dow’s expert
concluded that maternal ingestion of Bendectin during the first trimester of
pregnancy was not a risk factor for birth defects. 78
Although not disputing the published findings, the plaintiffs offered the
testimony of their own expert witnesses, all eight of whom found that Bendectin
could cause birth defects. 79 The witnesses based their conclusions on a combination
of animal-cell, live-animal, and pharmacological studies, and a reanalysis of
previously published epidemiological studies. 80 In granting Dow’s motion for
summary judgment, the district court found that the plaintiffs’ reanalysis of
published epidemiological studies was inadmissible because the reanalysis studies
had neither been published, nor subject to the peer review process. 81
Upon review of the lower court’s ruling, the Supreme Court in Daubert held that
the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 702, 82 replaced Frye’s “General
Acceptance” test in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. 83 The Court
assigned the trial judge the “gatekeeping” role of ensuring that an expert’s testimony
is relevant and has a solid foundation. 84
Under Rule 702, when expert testimony is offered, a trial judge must make a
preliminary assessment of whether the methodology underlying the expert’s
testimony is scientifically valid and whether it would assist the factfinder in
understanding the matter in issue. 85 The Court provided a non-exhaustive list of
factors to be considered in evaluating the admissibility of expert scientific testimony:
(1) whether technique or theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory or
77

Id. at 582.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 583.

80

Id.

81 Id. For a novel statistical approach analyzing the Bendectin data, see Jon Todd Powell,
How to Tell the Truth With Statistics: A New Statistical Approach to Analyzing the Bendectin
Epidemiological Data in the Aftermath of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 31 HOUS.
L. REV. 1241, 1291–1311 (Winter 1994).
82

Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.

83

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).

84

Id.

85

Id. at 592–93.
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technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; 86 (3) the known or
potential error rate of the scientific technique; and (4) general acceptance within the
relevant scientific community. 87
The federal judge’s gatekeeping role in screening scientific evidence was further
clarified in two subsequent Supreme Court decisions: General Electric Co. v.
Joiner 88 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 89
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the plaintiff, an electrician, alleged that
workplace exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls promoted his development of
small cell lung cancer. 90 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling,
which excluded the four epidemiological studies the plaintiff’s experts relied on
because they were not a sufficient basis for their opinions. 91 The Court noted that
neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of Evidence required a trial court to admit an
expert opinion, which rests solely on the authority of the expert witness and is
unsupported by the epidemiological data. 92 Thus, “too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered,” warrants exclusion of expert opinion
evidence. 93
Later, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court extended Daubert’s
“gatekeeping obligation” to all expert testimony and concluded that Daubert’s
reliability inquiry is a flexible one. 94 Therefore, instead of using Daubert’s factors
86 Although peer review and publication is an essential component of the research process,
it does not automatically attest to a study’s reliability. The Role of Epidemiology in DecisionMaking, supra note 69, at 18–19; see also Brief for Kenneth Rothman et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92102), 1992 WL 12006438, at *3 (arguing that (1) statistical significance is not necessary as a
requirement for drawing causal inferences from epidemiologic data; (2) by focusing on such
inappropriate criteria, a court forecloses testimony about inferences that can be drawn from a
combination of studies with statistically insignificant results; and (3) by suggesting an expert’s
“reanalysis” of published data is suspect unless published, a court “fundamentally
misconstrues how epidemiologists in the real world of science function on a daily basis”).
Publication deadlines often cause the review to be performed by someone less qualified in the
investigator’s own field and the sheer number of scientific journals increases the likelihood
that a research paper can get published somewhere. The Role of Epidemiology in DecisionMaking, supra note 69, at 18–19.
87

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.

88

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

89

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

90

Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139. The plaintiff, Robert Joiner, began working as an electrician in
1973. Id. at 193. His job required him to work with and around dielectric fluid, later
determined to be contaminated with polycholorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Id. “PCB’s are
widely known to be hazardous to human health” and were banned by Congress in 1978. Id.
91

Id. at 147–48.

92 Id. at 146 (“But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert”).
93

Id.

94

Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141, 150.
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as a definitive “checklist,” a trial judge must consider the specific circumstances and
issues of each case to determine the appropriate standard of admissibility. 95
The following subparts examine how Daubert and its progeny have been
interpreted to create a higher threshold for the admission of epidemiologic evidence,
and how this poses a problem for plaintiffs attempting to prove causation in product
liability cases.
A. Texas’s Strict Criteria for Determining Scientific Reliability
Various courts since Daubert have construed the Court’s ruling as placing
stringent standards on the scientific reliability of epidemiologic evidence required to
support a finding of causation. 96 The Texas Supreme Court adopted the strictest of
these interpretations in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner. 97 In another
case alleging that maternal ingestion of the anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, caused birth
defects, Texas’s highest court grappled with the issue of whether the plaintiff’s
causation evidence was scientifically reliable. 98 Here, the court held that if an
expert’s testimony is unreliable, then the testimony itself is not evidence. 99
Further, in determining the scientific reliability of expert testimony, a court must
look beyond the expert’s bare opinion. 100 In this regard, the Havner court
differentiated between the admissibility of scientific evidence and its legal
sufficiency in support of a finding of causation. The court declared that Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence dictates whether an expert’s opinion is admissible to
support a finding of causation and offers “substantive guidelines in determining if
95 Id; Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for
Medical Testimony, 288 JAMA 1382, 1383 (2002). For a discussion of the Daubert trilogy
and why its admissibility standards necessitate the appointment of forensic exerts in criminal
cases, see Laurel Gilbert, Sharpening the Tools of an Adequate Defense: Providing for the
Appointment of Experts for Indigent Defendants in Child Death Cases Under Ake v.
Oklahoma, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 469 (2013).
96 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 561; see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 347
S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2011); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717 (Tex.
1997); Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities and Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 378 (Vt.
2010) (finding “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering a relative risk
greater than 2.0 as a reasonable and helpful benchmark . . . .”); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (“For an epidemiological study to show
causation under a preponderance standard, ‘the relative risk of limb reduction defects arising
from the epidemiological data . . . will, at a minimum, have to exceed ‘2.’”) (citing DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)); Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors &
Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing scientific expert’s
probability estimate because it was not founded upon epidemiologic studies demonstrating a
relative risk value greater than 2.0).
97

Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 706 (Tex. 1997).

98

Id. at 711.

99

Id. at 714. “A flaw in the expert’s reasoning from the [epidemiologic] data may render
reliance on a study unreasonable and render the inferences drawn therefrom dubious. Under
that circumstance, the expert’s scientific testimony is unreliable and, legally, no evidence.” Id.
100

Id. at 711–12.
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the expert testimony is some evidence of probative value.” 101 Thus, if a claimant’s
evidence is deemed admissible, a court should then evaluate whether it is legally
sufficient to support a finding of causation based on the totality of the claimant’s
available evidence. 102
In order to be legally sufficient, a litigant must offer epidemiologic studies that
not only show a “substantially elevated risk” of disease, but must also demonstrate
that they are similar to the study’s participants. 103 Moreover, if there are alternative
causes of the disease, the litigant must introduce evidence negating those causes. 104
Further, in rejecting the reliability of the Havners’ epidemiologic evidence, the
Texas Supreme Court established several guidelines in considering its legal
sufficiency: (1) each epidemiologic study relied upon must report a statistically
significant relative risk 105 of at least 2.0; 106 (2) each study must be published or
otherwise subjected to the peer review process; (3) the study must not have been
prepared for litigation purposes; and (4) the claimant must provide at least two
properly designed epidemiologic studies that meet the above mentioned criteria. 107
The surprising premise behind Havner’s stringent requirements was the notion
that any study that did not find a statistically significant relative risk greater than 2.0

101 Id. These guidelines included: (1) the extent to which the theory has been tested; (2) the
extent to which the technique depends upon subjective interpretation; (3) whether the theory
has been subjected to peer review; (4) the technique’s rate of error; (5) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted as valid by the scientific community; and (6) the technique’s
non-judicial uses. Id. at 712 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d
549, 557 (Tex. 1995)).
102

Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Relative risk is an epidemiologic measure of association, which compares the rate of
disease development among a group of individuals that were exposed to a particular risk
factor and a group of individuals that were not exposed. See ANTONY STEWART, BASIC
STATISTICS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 113 (3d ed. 2010). Relative risk is
calculated by dividing the disease occurrence in the exposed group by the disease occurrence
in the non-exposed group. Id. If the relative risk value is greater than 1.0, then there is an
increased risk of developing disease if one is exposed to the risk factor. Id.
106 Recognizing the difficulty in equating scientific measures of association with legal
standards, the court in Havner nevertheless ruled that only properly designed and executed
epidemiologic studies finding that exposure more than doubled the risk of injury could be
used to support a finding of causation in toxic tort cases. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.
Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 17 (Tex. 1997). The court explained, however, that a relative risk
greater than 2.0 is not a “litmus test,” and that a single epidemiologic study is legally
insufficient to prove causation. Id. at 718. Indeed, the court acknowledged that a study may
have a high relative risk even in the absence of a causal relationship. Id.
107

See id. at 725–27.
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was unreliable. 108 Thus, an expert’s opinion that relied on that study was also
unreliable and inadmissible as evidence to prove causation. 109
B. The Problems with a Judge-Made Threshold for Admissibility of Epidemiologic
Evidence
Findings of liability in the context of toxic torts are rare because the judicial
system has erected seemingly insurmountable procedural and substantive barriers to
bring a claim, the most daunting of which is proving causation. 110 Judicially created
tests for the admissibility of epidemiologic evidence, such as the one developed by
the Texas Supreme Court in Havner, place an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs and
frequently result in the dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims. 111
108

See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Tex. 2011) (explaining the
court’s Havner holding).
109 See id.; see also Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714 (“If the foundational data underlying the
opinion testimony are unreliable, an expert will not be permitted to base an opinion on that
data because any opinion drawn from that data is likewise unreliable.”). Later, in Merck &
Co. v. Garza, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the Havner’s requirements for determining
whether epidemiological evidence is scientifically reliable to prove causation. Garza, 347
S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2011). Leonel Garza, plaintiffs’ decedent, had a long history of heart
disease and was prescribed Vioxx, an anti-inflammatory drug, marketed by the defendant,
Merck & Co. as a pain reliever. Id. Mr. Garza ingested 25 mg Vioxx a day for twenty-five
days until his death. Id. In a products liability lawsuit against Merck & Co., plaintiffs
introduced clinical trial studies showing an increased risk of cardiovascular disease as proof
that Vioxx caused Mr. Garza’s death. See id. at 259, 262. Although the court acknowledged
the increased reliability of clinical trials, as opposed to observational epidemiological studies,
it concluded that both types of studies must report a “statistically significant doubling of the
risk” in order to meet the more likely than not standard of proof. Id. at 263. The Texas
Supreme Court opted not to follow the holdings of other courts that had determined
epidemiologic studies with a relative risk less than 2.0 could suffice if supplemented with
other evidence of causation. Id. at 265 (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715). Other courts
favor a more flexible Daubert inquiry over bright-line rules and view a relative risk (or odds
ratio) value of 2.0 as one factor among many that the court can consider in determining the
reliability of an expert’s opinion. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Dow Agro Sciences, 705 F. Supp. 2d
471, 486 (W.D. Pa. 2010); see also Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F.
Supp. 2d 584, 606 (D.N.J. 2002) (“[A] relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password to a
finding of causation as one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to consider in
determining whether an expert has employed a sound methodology in reaching his or her
conclusion.”) (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079. 1087 (N.J. 1992)).
110
111

Conway-Jones, supra note 58, at 876.

Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28
cmt. c(1) (2010) (advising that courts should be cautious about adopting certain scientific
principles, taken out of context, in order to formulate bright-line legal rules because scientific
standards for the sufficiency of evidence to establish a proposition may not be appropriate for
the law and because causal inferences require judgment and interpretation); see also FAULT
LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 273 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds.,
2009) (“Plaintiffs can’t achieve epidemiological studies by themselves, epidemiology is not
the be all and end all of causal inquiry, and the courts–by and large–have turned their
‘gatekeeping’ function into more of a ‘search and destroy’ mission.”); Kassirer & Cecil, supra
note 95, at 1382 (“[C]ourts appear to be asserting standards that they attribute to the medical
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By equating a relative risk of 2.0 as meeting the more likely than not burden of
proof in civil cases, 112 courts mistakenly believe that a relative risk value greater than
2.0 is sufficient evidence for a finding of specific causation. 113 Consistent with the
decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, some courts have deemed as inadmissible
any epidemiologic evidence that does not show at least a statistically significant
doubling of the risk. 114
Commentators have also noted that courts are increasingly ignoring other
scientific evidence (such as animal studies, differential diagnoses, and chemical
structure comparisons) and over-emphasizing epidemiological evidence that
demonstrates a risk ratio greater than 2.0. 115 There is an inherent problem in relying
too heavily on a bright-line quantitative threshold for admissibility because statistical
methods alone cannot establish proof of causation. While the concept of “doubling
the risk” appears reasonable, some epidemiologists note that it does not represent a
more likely than not probability that an exposure will cause disease. 116 This is
because the “causal significance of an association is a matter of judgment which
goes beyond any statement of statistical probability.” 117 Indeed, the fundamental
problem of relying on epidemiologic evidence alone is that causal inferences can be
drawn from such studies only when coupled with additional data. 118
By ignoring scientific evidence that does not meet an arbitrary quantitative
standard, courts deprive juries of the opportunity to aggregate multiple pieces of

profession, but that are inconsistent and sometimes more demanding than actual medical
practice. As a result, plaintiffs seeking compensation for an illness attributed to a toxic
exposure lose the opportunity to present their evidence to a jury.”).
112

See Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting “Junk
Logic” About Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L. REV. 381, 473 n. 320 (2004) (“A relative risk
greater than ‘2’ means that the disease more likely than not was caused by the event.”).
113

Id. at 468.

114 In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224–26 (D. Colo. 1998) (finding that
if epidemiologic evidence did not show that breast implants doubled the risk of disease, then
plaintiff’s causation evidence was inadmissible); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.
Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp.
740, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (declaring that plaintiffs must prove at least a two-fold increase in
the incidence of disease allegedly caused by exposure to toxic substance). The court in In re
Breast Implant Litigation, noted that of at least seventeen epidemiological studies of breast
implants published in peer-reviewed medical journals, none consistently showed a significant
elevation of risk over 2.0. In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1227. Therefore, the
court concluded that breast implants did not cause any of the diseases that plaintiffs alleged.
Id. (emphasis added).
115 David Egilman, Joyce Kim & Molly Biklen, Proving Causation: The Use and Abuse of
Medical and Scientific Evidence Inside the Courtroom—An Epidemiologist’s Critique of the
Judicial Interpretation of the Daubert Ruling, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 223, 224 (2003).
116

Id. at 229.

117

Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the
Public Health Service, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE 20 (1984),
available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBMQ.pdf.
118

Id.
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evidence in determining causation. 119 Taking advantage of the stringent causation
hurdles faced by plaintiffs, product manufacturers have urged courts to evaluate each
type of study (animal, epidemiological, pathological, clinical, etc.) independently
from other forms of evidence, thus attacking the very means of proving causation. 120
V. AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC STUDY SHOULD BE EVALUATED ON THE BASIS OF ITS DESIGN,
CONDUCT, AND ANALYSIS.
Judicially created admissibility tests should be substituted with a comprehensive
approach that mirrors how practitioners derive causal inferences in the field. 121 This
Comment suggests that instead of relying on arbitrary cut-offs for determining the
admissibility of epidemiologic evidence, judges should evaluate the validity 122 of an
epidemiologic study on the basis of its design, conduct, and analysis. 123 In doing so,
it further proposes, as a rubric for assessing study validity, a series of questions that
119

See Egilman et al., supra note 115, at 224.

120

Id. at 231; see Kassirer & Cecil, supra note 95, at 1383–84 (“[A]ssessment of evidence
and causal inferences depend on accumulating all potentially relevant evidence and making a
subjective judgment about the strength of the evidence.”).
121 For example, physicians practicing the doctrine of evidence-based medicine use a
“current best evidence” approach when making decisions about individual patient care. Sean
C. Grondin & Colin Schieman, Evidence-Based Medicine: Levels of Evidence and Evaluation
Systems, Difficult Decisions, in THORACIC SURGERY 13 (M.K. Ferguson ed., 2011). A tenet of
evidence-based medicine is that a hierarchy of evidence exists based upon the soundness of
the study’s methodology and the subsequent strength of any inferences drawn from it. Id.
Evidence-based medicine recognizes that various forms of evidence may each provide
appropriate clinical recommendations, but that some forms are more reliable than others. Id.
at 14. Consequently, a hierarchy of the strength of evidence has been used to guide clinical
decision making. Id.
122

Assessing the validity of epidemiological studies amounts to evaluating whether the
causal inferences drawn from such studies are warranted. Julia H. Zaccai, How to Assess
Epidemiological Studies, 80 POSTGRAD MED. J. 140, 140 (2004).
123 Id.; The Role of Epidemiology in Decision-Making, supra note 69, at 21; NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, HEALTH RISKS FROM EXPOSURE TO LOW
LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR VII PHASE 2 139 (2006) (“The first step in the
interpretation of data is to assess the methods used in the study itself.”); Kassirer & Cecil,
supra note 95, at 1383 (“[E]very [epidemiologic] study must be scrutinized not only for . . .
confounders, but for the defects in study design, data quality, and the strength of the statistical
correlation.”). A similar approach for summarizing epidemiologic evidence in order to derive
a causal assessment is termed the “weight of the evidence approach.” Ronald H. White, et al.,
Workshop Report: Evaluation of Epidemiological Data Consistency for Application in
Regulatory Risk Assessment, 6 OPEN EPIDEMIOLOGY J. 1, 6 (2013). This approach takes into
account the results of all available studies and assigns “greater ‘weight’ to those considered to
have the greatest reliability and validity.” Id. The approach advocated in this Comment,
however, proposes that only validly conducted epidemiologic studies should be used as a basis
from which experts can draw any causal inferences. Another approach to weighing
epidemiologic evidence recommends that justifiable criteria must include “outcome
ascertainment, exposure measures, and other sources of bias,” rather than set rules designed to
assess study quality. Id.
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fact finders should ask of each epidemiologic study offered into evidence. 124 If a
study is deemed valid under these criteria, then experts may rely on its findings in
drawing causal inferences. This Comment also examines how these guidelines can
be used to assess the validity of epidemiological studies investigating dietary
exposures, particularly the link between HFCS consumption and type 2 diabetes.
A. Assessing the Validity of an Epidemiologic Study.
There are many potential reasons for why a study’s reported measure of
association (i.e. relative risk, odds ratio, or risk ratio) does not accurately quantify
the true causal relationship between exposure and disease. Two of the most
important concepts to consider in evaluating the validity of a study’s results are
confounding and bias. 125 Because chronic disease epidemiology generally utilizes
observational methods to detect associations between exposure and disease,
uncertainty exists in understanding the causes of various chronic conditions, such as
diabetes. 126 Errors in measurement or research design can produce misleading
results; therefore, considerable expertise is needed to assess the quality of a study’s
methodology and the validity of its purported findings. 127 A fact finder must
evaluate epidemiologic evidence and the causal inferences derived from them in
light of these factors.
1. Did Researchers Attempt to Minimize Confounding? 128
When an association is observed between a risk factor and disease,
epidemiologists must differentiate whether this association is causal or the result of
confounding by a third factor. 129
124 The following series of questions designed to assess study validity borrow from the
ideas of Julia H. Zaccai, as described in her article, “How to Assess Epidemiological Studies.”
Zaccai, supra note 122, at 143–44.
125 E.g., CHRONIC DISEASE EPIDEMIOLOGY AND CONTROL 43 (Patrick L. Remington, Ross
C. Brownson & Mark V. Wegner, eds., 3d ed. 2010).
126

See id.

127

Id.

128

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 123, at 139
(recommending that readers consider whether there is evidence that the study addressed the
potential confounding influences of other factors).
129

GORDIS, supra note 67, at 228. In Schwab v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., the court
examined the failure of early epidemiological studies exploring the association between lung
cancer and low tar cigarettes to account for confounding variables. 449 F. Supp. 2d 992,
1199–1200 (E.D.N.Y), rev’d on other grounds 552 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008). Early
epidemiologic studies concluded that reduced tar cigarettes were safer than their higher tar or
“full flavor” counterparts. Id. However, these studies did not consider the possibility that
people who smoked low tar cigarettes were also more likely to have healthier diets, exercise
more, or better protect themselves from hazardous occupational exposures, than smokers of
higher tar cigarettes. Id. Thus, the health consciousness of low tar cigarette smokers was a
potential confounding variable because their healthier lifestyle, rather than their use of low tar
cigarettes, could have accounted for their lower incidence of lung cancer. Id.
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Confounding is a distortion of the estimated effect of an exposure on an outcome
due to the presence of an extraneous factor that is associated with both the outcome
and the exposure. 130 A confounding variable is both: (1) a known independent risk
factor for the study disease; and (2) simultaneously associated with the exposure in
question, but not a consequence of exposure. 131
Confounding is a major source of error in nutritional epidemiology because it is
difficult to distinguish between diet and other life style factors that contribute to
obesity and its associated health consequences, such as type 2 diabetes. The
distortion caused by a confounding variable can be so large as to mask the true effect
of the exposure on the disease. 132 Therefore, readers of epidemiologic studies must
assess the possible role that confounding may have played in the study by
considering whether any important lifestyle factors have been taken into account in
the design and analysis phase of the study. 133 If a study fails to control for
confounding variables, any reported findings should be viewed with skepticism.
2. Were There Any Biases that Affected the Study’s Validity?
Inherent within each epidemiological study is the potential for bias, which is
“any systematic error in the design, conduct, or analysis of a study that results in a
mistaken estimate of the exposure’s effect on the risk of disease.” 134 Bias in an
epidemiologic study can distort the true association between exposure and disease
and affects the reliability of the study’s results. 135 Although researchers can attempt
to minimize bias by carefully planning their study’s design and analysis, it is
impossible to eliminate completely.
The presence of bias, however, does not automatically mean that the study’s
results should be rejected. Instead, each bias should be individually identified and
addressed before a study’s results can be used as evidence of a causal relationship.
Epidemiologic studies investigating the role of nutrition in the development of
chronic disease are prone to two types of biases: selection and recall bias.

130 LAST, supra note, 65 at 37. A common example of confounding is illustrated in the
relationship between coffee drinking and pancreatic cancer. GORDIS, supra note 67, at 228.
In this case, smoking is the confounding variable because (1) it is a known risk factor for
pancreatic cancer; and (2) is concurrently associated with coffee drinking, but is not a result of
it. Id. Thus, the apparent association between coffee consumption and pancreatic cancer
could be either that coffee drinking actually causes pancreatic cancer or that individuals who
drink coffee are also more likely to smoke cigarettes, a recognized risk factor for cancer. Id.
131

GORDIS, supra note 67, at 228; JAMES J. SCHLESSELMAN, CASE-CONTROL STUDIES:
DESIGN, CONDUCT, AND ANALYSIS 58 (1982) (“A confounder’s association with the study
disease may be either cause-and-effect or a noncausal relation resulting from the confounder’s
association with causal factors other than the study exposure.”).
132

Zaccai, supra note 122, at 141 (“The distortion introduced by a confounding factor can
be large and it can lead to overestimation or underestimation of an effect . . . .”).
133

Id.

134

SCHLESSELMAN, supra note 131, at 124.

135

Zaccai, supra note 122, at 140.
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a. Did Subject Recruitment Methods Minimize Selection Bias? 136
Ideally, investigators want study groups to be comparable on every possible
variable besides the exposure of interest. Unfortunately, the procedures used to
select subjects and the factors that influence study participation are potential sources
of error that can distort a study’s findings. 137 Selection bias is error due to
systematic differences in characteristics between subjects and non-subjects. 138
In nutritional studies, selection bias occurs when a study’s recruitment methods
systematically exclude or over-represent certain types of subjects, such that the
study’s results are not generalizable to the overall population. 139 Therefore, in a
case-control study 140 investigating type 2 diabetes and past HFCS exposure, cases
and controls should be selected independently of their likelihood to have consumed
HFCS in the past. 141 Similarly, in a cohort study 142 examining HFCS consumption
and future development of type 2 diabetes, exposed and nonexposed subjects should
be chosen independently of their risk for developing diabetes. 143

136 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 123, at 139
(suggesting that one of the first steps in the interpretation of data is to consider whether there
is evidence that selection bias has been avoided in enrolling the study subjects).
137

KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, SANDER GREENLAND & TIMOTHY L. LASH, MODERN
EPIDEMIOLOGY 134 (3d ed. 2008). Dr. Ann McKee, a leading researcher of the long-term
consequences of repetitive brain trauma and its role in the development of chronic traumatic
encephalopathy (CTE) among football players, addressed the possibility of selection bias in
her autopsy sample of deceased football players. Frontline: A League of Denial (PBS
television
broadcast
Oct.
8,
2013),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/league-of-denial/. She described selection bias as
the greater likelihood of families of a player who they suspect is affected by CTE to donate
their brain to CTE research than a family of a player with no symptoms at all. Id.
138 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 140; LAST, supra note 65, at 166. In the case of In re “Agent
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., the court discussed selection bias in the context of a cohort study
consisting of young, healthy men who served in Vietnam. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab.
Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). The court
found that comparing the mortality rate of the cohort and that of a control group comprised of
civilians made it difficult to obtain useful data. Id. The young males in the cohort “were a
highly selected, healthy group so that the expected mortality was relatively slight in their early
ages and a comparison with base civilian populations difficult.” Id.
139

For example, 24-hour recall interviews that are only conducted in English would
necessarily exclude from participation, non-English speaking individuals.
140

See infra note 173.

141

See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 584.

142

See infra note 170.

143

See FED. JUDICIAL CTR, supra note 64, at 584.
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b. If Performing a Case-Control Study, Did Researchers Adopt Measures to Prevent
Recall Bias?
Recall bias occurs when there is a difference, among cases and controls, in being
able to accurately recall past events or experiences. 144 The potential for recall bias to
distort a measure of association is a major concern in case-control studies,
particularly when the exposure involves nutrient intake. 145 Diagnosis can affect
subject reporting by improving memory or provoking false memories of exposure. 146
For instance, diseased subjects are more likely able to remember what foods and
beverages they consumed and may, in their search for the cause, overemphasize the
role of diet in their disease. 147
Additionally, whereas cohort studies measure diet before the onset of disease,
case-control studies obtain exposure information after diagnosis has occurred. Cases
are thus, more likely to recollect their prior exposures differently from controls
because they are more motivated to participate in the study and determine the cause
of their disease. 148
Epidemiologists use measures of association to derive causal inferences,
however, the reliability of those inferences must be considered by evaluating
whether the potential biases inherent in the study invalidate its results. 149 Therefore,
potential biases and their effect on the estimated measure of association must be

144 See SCHLESSELMAN, supra note 131, at 135. A case-control study examines the possible
relationship between a particular exposure and a disease by first identifying a group of
individuals with the disease (cases) and a similar group of individuals without the disease
(controls). GORDIS, supra note 67, at 159, 161 (“The hallmark of the case-control study is that
it begins with people with the disease (cases) and compares then to people without the disease
(controls).”). The relationship between a single exposure to disease is examined by
comparing cases and controls in regard to how frequently the exposure is present in each
group. Id. at 150. Using this type of study design, a positive association exists between the
exposure and disease when the proportion of individuals who were exposed is higher in cases
than in controls. Id. at 160.
145 See Satu Männistö et al., Diet and the Risk of Breast Cancer in a Case-Control Study:
Does the Threat of Disease Have an Influence on Recall Bias? 52 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 429,
430 (1999).
146

ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 111. For example, a mother whose child was born
with a congenital malformation will be more likely to identify events or experiences during
her pregnancy than a mother of a child born without a birth defect. See generally Martha M.
Werler, Barbara R. Pober, Kathryn Nelson & Lewis B. Holms, Reporting Accuracy Among
Mothers of Malformed and Nonmalformed Infants, 129 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 415 (1989).
Contrasting recollections between mothers may artificially suggest a relationship between an
exposure during pregnancy and congenital malformations. Id.
147 Baerbel Bellach & Lenore Kohlmeier, Energy Adjustment Does Not Control for
Differential Recall Bias in Nutritional Epidemiology, 51 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 393, 393
(1998) (emphasis added).
148

See id.

149

See FED. JUDICIAL CTR, supra note 64, at 583.
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identified and weighed to determine whether the bias “exaggerate[d] the real
association, dilute[d] it, or . . . completely mask[ed] it.” 150
B. Evaluating the Study’s Design and Conduct
1. Was the Chosen Study Design Appropriate to Answer the Research
Hypothesis? 151
In the past, epidemiological inquiries of diet and disease consisted of ecological
studies, which compared “disease rates in populations with the population per capita
consumption of specific dietary factors.” 152 Although ecologic studies have been
useful in stimulating research on the link between diet and chronic diseases, their
primary drawback is the possibility that confounding factors—such as genetic
predisposition, other dietary determinants of disease, and environmental or lifestyle
influences—may vary between regions with high and low incidence of disease. 153
Therefore, such correlational studies cannot yield reliable conclusions regarding the
relationships between dietary factors and disease and should be given the least
weight when determining causation. 154
150 Id. (“In reviewing the validity of an epidemiologic study, the epidemiologist must
identify potential biases and analyze the amount or kind of error that might have been induced
by the bias.”).
151

Zaccai, supra note 122, at 141 (“Researchers have a choice of several study designs for
their investigation and a judgment must be made as to whether their choice is reasonable in
relation to the question they wish to consider.”). For a more comprehensive discussion about
epidemiologic study designs investigating nutritional exposures and disease outcomes, see
ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 581–86.
152 WALTER WILLETT, NUTRITIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 4 (1998).
Such studies are
advantageous because they reveal large contrasts in international dietary intake, the use of
average dietary consumption measures offsets changing dietary patterns over time, and large
population samples are subject to less random error. Id. at 4–5. For an example of an
ecological study investigating the relationship between availability of high fructose corn syrup
and prevalence of type 2 diabetes, see generally Goran et al., supra note 29, at 1.
153 WILLETT, supra note 152, at 4–5. Another limitation of all ecological studies is the
potential for what is known as the “ecological fallacy.” It is “[a]n error in inference due to
failure to distinguish between different levels of organization.” LAST, supra note 65, at 56–
57. Thus, a correlation between variables based on group characteristics may not necessarily
mean there is a correlation between variables at the individual level. For example, suppose at
the population level, researchers found a correlation between quality of drinking water and
deaths due to heart disease in a certain region, it would be an ecological fallacy to infer that
consuming low quality drinking necessarily influences an individual’s chance of dying from
hearth disease. Id. at 57. For more discussion of biases in ecologic studies, see Sander
Greenland & James Robins, Ecologic Studies—Biases, Misconceptions, and
Counterexamples, 139 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 747–60 (1994).
154 See WILLETT, supra note 152, at 5; FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 561
(“[Ecological] studies may be useful for identifying associations, but they rarely provide
definitive causal answers.”). In Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., plaintiff’s expert conducted an
ecological study assessing the pattern of cancer incidence among residents living near a
nuclear weapons plant. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1095–98 (D.
Colo. 2006). Defendants argued that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible because he

290

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 28:264

Case-control 155 and cohort studies 156 can avoid many of the weaknesses inherent
in ecological studies because confounding can be neutralized in either the design or
analysis phases. 157 Although case-controls studies are generally easier to perform
than cohort studies—because of its smaller sample size and lack of follow up—the
inherent difficulties in being able to recall past food consumption makes the results
of a case-control study unreliable. 158
Not only do case-control study subjects have to recall what they ate, when they
ate it, and how much they ate, considering that HFCS concentration differs
according to product, subjects must also remember the food product’s brand name.
Additionally, because HFCS is commonly used to sweeten beverages, subjects
would also have to recollect what they drank, how much, and how often they drank
it. The inability of people to accurately remember what they ate and drank on a daily
basis over an extended period of time introduces systematic error, or recall bias, that
will inevitably distort any measure of association derived from the study. 159
Cohort studies present a more promising methodology for elucidating a causal
relationship between HFCS consumption and type 2 diabetes. One of the most
used an ecologic study as his method of analysis. Id. The court noted that such studies were
useful for establishing associations but provided relatively weak evidence for establishing a
conclusive causal relationship between a certain exposure and disease. Id. The court,
however, held that this relative weakness as to causation went to the weight to be accorded the
study rather than its admissibility. Id.
155 A case-control study compares persons with the disease of interest (cases) and persons
without the disease (controls). “[T]he past history of exposure to a suspected risk factor is
compared between ‘cases’ and ‘controls.’” E.g., LAST, supra note 65, at 22. A case-control
study is termed “retrospective” because the study begins after the onset of disease and looks
backwards in time to investigate exposure to suspected causal factors. Id. The measure of
association derived from a case-control study is termed the odds ratio. Id. In this context, the
odds ratio represents the odds that a person with type 2 diabetes consumed HFCS as opposed
to a person without type 2 diabetes and thus asks the question: “What are the odds that a case
was exposed to the study risk factor?” GORDIS, supra note 67, at 183 (emphasis added); see
STEWART, supra note 105, at 115 (calculating odds ratio by dividing the odds that subjects
with disease were exposed to risk factor by the odds that subjects without the disease were
exposed to the risk factor).
156

A cohort study follows a group of healthy individuals who are, have been, or in the
future may be exposed or not exposed to a postulated risk factor. E.g., LAST, supra note 65, at
33–34. The frequency of the outcome variable is compared between exposed and unexposed
groups. Id. A cohort study is prospective in its design because it follows exposed and
unexposed individuals forward in time to see who develops the disease outcome. Id. If the
frequency of disease development is higher in exposed persons than in unexposed persons, it
may suggests causality between the exposure and disease variables. Id.
157

WILLETT, supra note 152, at 6.

158

Id. (“[C]onsistently valid results may be difficult to obtain from case-control studies of
dietary factors and disease because of the inherent potential for methodologic bias.”).
159 See Karin B. Michels, Nutritional Epidemiology—Past, Present, Future, 32 INT’L J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 486 (2003); see also ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 582; Bellach &
Kohlmeier, supra note 147, at 398 (“The concern that cases an controls report their energy
intakes with different degrees of error remains a critical consideration that must be addressed
through improved measures.”).
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attractive features of a cohort study design is its ability to directly measure risk of
disease development. 160 Moreover, due to its prospective nature, dietary information
is collected before the onset of disease and as the study progresses, resulting in more
accurate dietary assessments. Because a cohort study is less susceptible to the
potential sources of bias associated with case-control studies, it provides more
reliable results from which to draw causal inferences. 161 Therefore, among the three
study designs discussed, the results of a validly conducted cohort study should be
given the greatest evidentiary weight.
2. How Were Study Subjects Chosen?
The composition of a study population determines the generalizability of its
results. A study is “generalizable” when its findings can be extrapolated to a target
population beyond the subjects of the study itself. 162 In order for readers to assess
the generalizability of a study’s results, researchers must describe the characteristics
of the study population, including how many and under what circumstances
participants were excluded from subsequent statistical analysis. 163 What was the
study’s attrition rate? 164 Was it so high that the main characteristics of the study and
control groups changed significantly? 165
A study with a high attrition rate, which reduces its ability to demonstrate an
association 166 and offsets differences in exposure between study groups, should be
160

Cohort studies, which follow non-diseased exposed and unexposed subjects forward in
time in order to see whether or not disease develops, is the preferred method to assess risk.
GORDIS, supra note 67, at 149. Because the study begins with non-diseased subjects, it can
establish a temporal relationship between exposure and disease outcome. Id. Drawbacks to
this method include cost, its long follow up period, potential for subject attrition, and
inapplicability for diseases with low incidence. Zaccai, supra note 122, at 142.
161

WILLETT, supra note 152, at 9.

162

LAST, supra note 65, at 184–85. Public health research attempts to extrapolate findings
to the general public. SAVITZ, supra note 66, at 12. Extrapolation, however, does not occur
from a single study, rather, findings are generalizable to the larger population when drawn
from a series of validly conducted studies. Id.
163

See Zaccai, supra note 122, at 143. Characteristics of study participants include
baseline health and sociodemographic information such as sex, race, socioeconomic status,
and age. Id.
164 Attrition occurs when subjects permanently leave the study.
Vicki L. Kristman,
Michael Manno & Pierre Côté, Methods to Account for Attrition in Longitudinal Data: Do
They Work?, 20 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 657, 657 (2005). Because data is no longer collected
from these subjects, attrition leads to missing exposure, confounder, or outcome data. Id.
This loss of data threatens the validity of the study, decreases sample size, and undermines the
precision of the risk estimate. Id.

165 Zaccai, supra note 122, at 143. These factors are particularly relevant in evaluating
nutritional cohort studies because of the study’s long follow up and potential for participant
fatigue due to intensive dietary assessments.
166 The ability to demonstrate an association is termed a study’s power. “The power of a
study is determined by several factors, including the frequency of the condition under study,
the magnitude of the effect, the study design, and sample size.” LAST, supra note 65, at 138.
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given less weight in the causal assessment because these factors lead to selection
bias and thus, a spurious estimate of association between variables. 167
3. How Did Researchers Define Exposure and Outcome Measures?
Measurement bias occurs when researchers do not accurately define how subjects
will be classified in regards to their exposure and disease status. 168 A study’s results
can be invalidated by simply failing to choose which measurements, whether it is
exposure, disease, or confounding variable, will be recorded and how. 169 A clear
definition of what constitutes “exposed” or “diseased” must be decided
beforehand. 170
For example, in a cohort study evaluating the association between HFCS
consumption and diabetes, researchers must decide what level of HFCS consumption
qualifies a subject as “exposed” for the purposes of the study. Due to the ubiquitous
nature of HFCS in the nation’s food supply, most people have consumed HFCS at
one time or another. The relevant question thus becomes, what dosage and
frequency of HFCS consumption classifies an individual as exposed? This is an
important factor to consider when evaluating epidemiological studies because setting
exposure to HFCS at abnormally high consumption levels would likely overestimate
the effect of HFCS on health outcomes. 171 Findings from such a study should,
therefore, be cautiously viewed because its results are generalizable only to a
population that similarly consumes excessive amounts of HFCS-containing foods or
beverages.
4. How was Dietary Intake Measured? 172
In addition to developing an explicit definition of what constitutes “exposed,”
researchers must also adopt a reliable method for measuring exposure. A major
hurdle in the burgeoning field of nutritional epidemiology is that investigations of
dietary exposures have traditionally focused on the role of individual foods in
contributing to disease. 173 The case of HFCS, however, presents a new challenge for
researchers because ingredients are not consumed in isolation but, rather, as part of a
167

See Kristman et al., supra note 164, at 657 (“Attrition leads to selection bias when the
distribution of confounders and outcome among the exposed and non-exposed subjects is
dependent on whether they remained in the study. This bias may lead to spurious risk
estimates of unpredictable magnitude and direction.”) (citation omitted).
168

Zaccai, supra note 122, at 143.

169

See id.

170

Therefore, the criteria for including and excluding potential study subjects must be
planned and clearly delineated a priori, accounting for their degree of exposure, pre-existing
health conditions, relevant demographic characteristics, and disease diagnosis. Id.
171 Conversely, setting exposure to low levels of HFCS consumption would likely
underestimate or fail to capture the true effect of HFCS on health outcomes. Id.
172

See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 123, at 139
(proposing that one of the first questions to consider when interpreting epidemiologic data is
whether there is “evidence that information bias has been minimized in assessing exposure or
disease”).
173

Michels, supra note 159, at 487.
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complex assortment of various other ingredients, nutrients, and food products based
Therefore, the single greatest limitation to
upon individual preference. 174
investigating the role of a particular food ingredient in disease development is the
difficulty of accurately measuring dietary intake. 175
Currently, the most widely used dietary assessment technique is the 24-hour food
recall, whereby subjects are asked to report their food intake during the previous
day. 176 Food researchers also employ food diaries, which provide “detailed meal-bymeal recordings of types and quantities of foods and beverages consumed during a
specified period.” 177 The validity of both methods, however, is questionable due to
inaccurate subject recall, highly variable day-to-day intake of specific foods, and the
174 Id. Unlike exposures that are more easily quantifiable—such as cigarettes smoking—an
individual’s diet “represents an unusually complex set of exposures that are strongly
intercorrelated.” WILLETT, supra note 152, at 2; ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 586
(“The foods we consume each day contain literally thousands of specific chemicals, some
known and well quantified, some characterized only poorly, and others completely
undescribed and presently unmeasurable.”). Further compounding the difficulty of studying
diet is that: 1) nutritional exposures are continuous variables; 2) eating patterns change over
time; and 3) individuals are generally not aware of the ingredients of the foods that they eat.
WILLETT, supra note 152, at 2.
175 WILLETT, supra note 152, at 3; see DAVID A. KESSLER, THE END OF OVEREATING:
TAKING CONTROL OF THE INSATIABLE AMERICAN APPETITE 2 (2009) (“Most people do a poor
job of reporting what they eat, and overweight people are particularly inaccurate reporters. So
much of our eating takes place outside our awareness that it’s easy to underestimate how
much food we actually put into our bodies.”). The next frontier of nutritional epidemiological
research will thus, attempt to incorporate complex dietary patterns into less traditional analytic
models. Michels, supra note 159, at 487. Possible statistical models include the use of factor
analysis, principal component analysis, cluster analysis, and developing diet scores. Id.
176 ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 589. The 24-hour recall is the assessment method
of choice for most national nutrition surveys because it requires no training or literacy and
poses a minimal burden on study subjects. Id. The National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey (NHANES) is a national dietary survey “designed to assess the health
and nutritional status of adults and children in the United States.” National Health and
Nutrition Examination Survey, 2013-2014: Let’s Improve Our Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhanes/nhanes_13_14/201314_overview_brochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). It collects information on food,
nutrient, and supplement intake through the use of 24-hour dietary recalls (conducted in
person by trained interviewers), food frequency questionnaires, survey questionnaires, and 26item dietary screener questionnaires (DSQ). Dietary Screener Questionnaire in the NHANES
CANCER
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
3,
2013),
2009-10,
NATIONAL
http://appliedresearch.cancer.gov/studies/nhanes/dietscreen/; Measuring Guides for the
Dietary Recall Interview, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 20, 2010),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/measuring_guides_dri/measuringguides.htm.
To view a
sample questionnaire assessing dietary behavior, see Diet Behavior and Nutrition-DBQ,
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
(Jan.
15,
2013),
CENTERS
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhanes/nhanes_13_14/DBQ_H.pdf.
The wide variety of
assessment instruments illustrates the difficulty of accurately capturing dietary intake. Id.
177

ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 589. This technique should increase the accuracy
of subject reporting because foods are recorded as they are consumed, however, it also places
a substantial burden on subjects who must weigh and describe their meals and portion sizes.
Id.
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fact that many meals are eaten away from home. 178 Despite these inherent
drawbacks, due to their low cost and ease of administration, the 24-hour recall and
food diary will continue to be utilized until a more accurate real-time dietary
assessment tool is developed. Consequently, nutritional epidemiologic studies that
utilize these methods should not be discounted; instead, readers must interpret the
study’s findings in light of the limitations of measuring dietary exposures.
C. Is there Evidence of a Causal Relationship using Hill’s Criteria? 179
Finally, demonstrating a strong association between an exposure and disease
does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. The Bradford Hill criteria 180 are
often used as a tool for determining whether an observed association in an
epidemiologic study reflects a causal association between a risk factor and disease. 181
These criteria are: (1) strength of association; 182 (2) consistency; 183 (3) temporal

178

Id.

179

E.g., OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH 650–652 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 4th ed.
2002) (noting that Hill’s criteria is commonly used by epidemiologists to separate causal from
non-causal explanations).
180

The Bradford-Hill Criteria are derived from Sir Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment
and Disease: Association or Causation? 58 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y OF MED. 295–
99 (1965).
181 See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 64, at 597–606; Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms.
Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 514-16 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (applying the Bradford-Hill criteria to
evaluate whether a pharmaceutical drug causes intracerebral hemorrhage); Amorgianos v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 147, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Even when an
appropriately designed study yields evidence of a statistical association between a given
substance and a given health outcome, epidemiologists generally do not accept such an
association by itself as proof of a causal relationship between the exposure and outcome.
Epidemiologists generally look to several additional criteria to determine whether a statistical
association is indeed causal. These criteria are sometimes referred to as the Bradford Hill
criteria . . . .”) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 44 (William N. Rom
ed., 3d ed. 1998) and CASARETT & DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 79
(Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 5th ed. 1996)); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Navarro, 90 S.W.3d 747,
753 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (“Dr. Dayal testified that if an epidemiological study finds a
relationship between an exposure and a disease, you still must apply the Bradford Hill ninestep criteria.”).

182 The strength of association is proportional to the magnitude of the estimated risk ratio—
the larger the magnitude the more compelling a finding of causation. See generally Hill,
supra note 180, at 296; but see ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 26 (“[A] strong
association is neither necessary nor sufficient for causality, and . . . weakness is neither
necessary nor sufficient for absence of causality.”).
183

Consistency is whether the association has “been repeatedly observed by different
persons, in different places, circumstances and times.” Hill, supra note 180, at 296; see also
Smoking and Health, supra note 117, at 182 (“[Consistency] implies that diverse methods of
approach in the study of an association will provide similar conclusions.”).
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relationship between exposure and disease; 184 (4) biological plausibility; 185 (5)
coherence; 186 (6) specificity; 187 (7) dose-response relationship; 188 (8) analogy; 189 and
(9) experimentation. 190 Although this list represents relevant characteristics in
evaluating a study, the author himself warned that such “viewpoints” should not be
used as a set of rigid guidelines establishing causation. 191 Thus, the fulfillment of
Hill’s criteria is not dispositive. 192 Instead, they should be considered additional
factors in evaluating whether a study’s results supports a causal association between
a dietary exposure and disease outcome.
The findings of poorly designed epidemiologic studies are of little value when
deriving causal inferences. 193 Therefore, interpreters of epidemiologic evidence
should not accept a study’s findings without considering the methodology used to
184

This factor “refers to the necessity that the cause precede the effect in time.” ROTHMAN
supra note 137, at 28. Temporality and statistical association are the only two criteria
that, although not dispositive, are necessary for drawing causal inferences. CAUSATION IN
LAW AND MEDICINE 453 (Ian Frecklton & Danuta Mendelson eds., 2002).
ET AL.,

185 Plausibility concerns whether there is a biological mechanism for an association. This
criterion, however, is dependent upon the current state of scientific knowledge at the time of
assessment. See Hill, supra note 180, at 298.
186

Coherence implies that the suspected causal relationship should not contradict known
facts in the natural history and biology of the disease. Id. (citing Smoking and Health, supra
note 117, at 185).
187

Considered the weakest of all Hill’s viewpoints, “[a]n association is specific when a
certain exposure is associated with only one disease.” GORDIS, supra note 67, at 215
(emphasis added).
188 Also referred to as “biological gradient,” this criterion refers to a unidirectional doseresponse relationship, whereby increasing exposure results in increasing disease severity.
OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 179, at 651. For example, as the number of
cigarettes smoked increases so do carcinogen exposure and tissue damage, and thus, greater
opportunity for cancer formation. Id.
189 “[A]nalogy provides a source of more elaborate hypotheses about the associations under
study[] the absence of [which] only reflects lack of imagination or experience, not the falsity
of the hypothesis.” OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 179, at 652.
190

Hill, supra note 180, at 295–99. Although Hill was unclear about what he meant by
experimentation, he was likely referring to experimental evidence that was the result of
removing the suspected causative agent in order to see if disease subsided. OXFORD
TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 179, at 651.
191

Id. at 299 (“None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or against
the cause-and-effect hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua non.”).
Epidemiologists are also in accord with this view. See, e.g., ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 137,
at 30 (“Other than [the necessity that the cause precede the effect in time] there is no
necessary or sufficient criterion for determining whether an observed association is causal.”).
192 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(1)
(2010) (“No algorithm exists for applying the Hill guidelines to determine whether an
association truly reflects a causal relationship or is spurious. Because the inferential process
involves assessing multiple unranked factors, some of which may be more or less appropriate
with regard to a specific causal assessment, judgment is required.”).
193

The Role of Epidemiology in Decision-Making, supra note 69, at 18.
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obtain those results. 194 Moreover, arbitrary standards for determining whether
epidemiologic studies can serve as the basis for causal inferences should not be set
so high that plaintiffs are barred from using this evidence to prove causation. 195
Indeed, it should be recognized that causal inferences “fall along a continuum of
interpretation, [where] even . . . methodologically weak studies are fodder for the
assessment of causality.” 196 Valid studies that modestly contribute to our
understanding of the relationship between an exposure and disease outcome should
be valued and viewed as another component in the comprehensive framework of
evidence from which to make a causal evaluation. 197
VI. CONDUCT-BASED DEFENSES POTENTIALLY LIMIT THE LIABILITY OF HFCS
MANUFACTURERS

A. Assumption of Risk
Even if HFCS plaintiffs can establish causation, they must still overcome
conduct-based defenses, which limit the liability of food manufacturers. The
assumption of risk doctrine is an affirmative defense that bars recovery in cases
where a plaintiff voluntarily assumes a risk of harm from the conduct of the
defendant. 198 A plaintiff, who fully understands the risk of harm and voluntarily
chooses to consume the food product despite that knowledge, implicitly accepts any
risks associated with the consumption and is not entitled to recovery. 199 Therefore,
plaintiffs must establish that their decision to eat products containing HFCS was not
a decision freely made because “as long as a consumer exercises free choice with
appropriate knowledge, liability for negligence will not attach to the
manufacturer.” 200
Plaintiffs in S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland, however, claim that the aggressive
attempts of the Corn Refiners Association, a national trade association of corn
manufacturers, to undo HFCS’s bad reputation were part of an effort to misrepresent
and conceal the science and consequences of HFCS ingestion. 201 In order for
plaintiffs to recover for their injuries, they must demonstrate that HFCS
manufacturers did not adequately inform consumers of the risks associated with

194

Zaccai, supra note 122, at 141.

195

See SAVITZ, supra note 66, at 21.

196

Id.

197

See id.

198

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). When a plaintiff fully understands
the risk of harm caused by a food product and nevertheless voluntarily chooses to consume it,
the plaintiff impliedly accepts the risk and is thus not entitled to any recovery. Id. at § 496C.
199

Id. at § 496C.

200

Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 533.

201 Complaint at 10, S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 1:13-cv-634S, 2014 WL
1600414, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2014), 2013 WL 3070911 at *55.
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HFCS consumption. 202 If consumers were unaware, uninformed, or deliberately
misled about the risks of HFCS, then their decisions were not freely made and the
assumption of the risk defense is inapplicable. 203
B. Contributory Negligence
Plaintiffs alleging injury from HFCS consumption may also be barred from
recovery under the doctrine of contributory negligence. Similar to the assumption of
risk doctrine, a person is liable for contributory negligence if he or she knows, or
should have known, the circumstances from which the danger arose and still
intentionally exposed himself to the danger. 204 In other words, although a food
manufacturer’s negligence is a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s type 2 diabetes, he
or she will be completely barred from recovering if his or her own conduct fell
below the standard of care and proximately caused the same injury. 205

202 See John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food
Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 127 (2003).
203

Id. The Corn Refiners Association (CRA), a national trade association of corn
manufacturers, argues that adverse health consequences, such as obesity, are not caused solely
by HFCS consumption but by the overconsumption of unhealthy foods. See generally
Veronica Louie, Masquerading Behind Words: The Corn Refiners Association’s Push to
Rename High-Fructose Corn Syrup as “Corn Sugar,” 4 NORTHEASTERN. U. L.J. 293, 302
(2012). As support for their contention, they cite to numerous scientific articles that call into
question claims of the negative effects of HFCS. Id. at 303. The CRA ran national
advertisement campaigns to convince consumers that HFCS was equivalent to regular table
sugar and in 2010, petitioned the Food and Drug Association to rename HFCS as “corn
sugar.” Id. at 293; see Corn Refiners Association, Myth vs. Facts, SWEETSURPRISE.COM,
http://sweetsurprise.com/hfcs-myths-and-facts (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (“[HFCS] is
basically the same as sugar–both in terms of composition and in the number of calories they
contain. Since [HFCS] and sugar are so similar, the human body absorbs them the same
way.”). In 2012, the Food & Drug Administration denied the CRA’s petition to use the term
“corn sugar” to describe HFCS because the term “would suggest that HFCS is a solid, dried,
and crystallized sweetener obtained from corn.” Michael M. Landa, Response to Petition
from Corn Refiners Association to Authorize “Corn Sugar” as an Alternate Common or Usual
Name for High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 30, 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/CFSANFOIAElectroni
cReadingRoom/ucm305226.htm. However, “HFCS is an aqueous solution sweetener derived
from corn after enzymatic hydrolysis of cornstarch, followed by enzymatic conversion of
glucose . . . to fructose.” Id.

204 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466 cmt. c and d (1965) (recognizing that
assumption of risk and contributory negligence doctrines overlap when the plaintiff
voluntarily consents to encounter a known danger arising from the defendant’s negligent act).
205

1 J. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 10:1 (2d
ed. 2013); Schmidt v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 515 N.W.2d 756, 792 (Neb. 1994)
(“Contributory negligence is conduct for which the plaintiff is responsible, amounting to a
breach of the duty imposed upon persons to protect themselves from injury, and which,
concurring with actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, is a proximate cause of
injury.”).
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C. Comparative Responsibility
In products liability actions, most jurisdictions apply the doctrine of comparative
Unlike assumption of risk and contributory negligence,
responsibility. 206
comparative responsibility reduces the plaintiff’s recovery in proportion to his or her
degree of fault. 207 Some jurisdictions have adopted a “pure” version of comparative
fault that “allocates responsibility to each actor . . . in proportion to the actor’s
percentage of total fault.” 208
In order to prevail under this defense, a HFCS manufacturer must demonstrate
that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by consuming excess amounts of food products
containing HFCS, when he was aware of its potential negative health effects. 209
Specifically, that a reasonable person would have learned of the dangers of
overconsumption and modified his eating habits to reduce his risk for harm. 210
Consumers, however, could argue that because they were unaware of the health
risks associated with HFCS consumption, they did not voluntarily expose themselves
to the danger. Indeed, the Corn Refiners Association’s “Sweet Surprise” marketing
campaign that attempts to recast HFCS as “corn sugar,” may demonstrate that the
dangers of HFCS were not within the common knowledge of the average
consumer. 211
Furthermore, product misuse, a type of consumer behavior, could play a factor in
apportioning liability. HFCS manufacturers may argue that overconsumption of
foods containing HFCS is a misuse of the product and that such overconsumption
constitutes contributory fault, thereby reducing the plaintiff’s recovery. 212 Although
most consumers are generally aware of the relationship between overeating and
obesity, the success of these conduct-based affirmative defenses rests on the ability
of food manufacturers to prove that consumers had specific knowledge of the risk
that the consumption of HFCS containing products could lead to negative health
effects, such as diabetes. 213

206

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. a (1998).

207

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451 (5th ed. 1984).

208 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. b (1998); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 (2000) (“Plaintiff’s negligence . . . that is a
legal cause of an indivisible injury to the plaintiff reduces the [their] recovery in proportion to
the share of responsibility the factfinder assigns to the plaintiff . . . .”).
209 See Richard C. Ausness, Tell Me What You Eat, and I Will Tell You Whom to Sue: Big
Problems Ahead for “Big Food”?, 39 GA. L. REV. 839, 882 (2005).
210

Id.

211

Louie, supra note 203, at 293.

212

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. a (1998). The plaintiffs in
Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. advanced this argument.
213

See generally Ausness, supra note 209, at 883.
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VII. APPORTIONING LIABILITY AMONG SEVERAL MANUFACTURERS IS A BARRIER TO
RECOVERY FOR HFCS PLAINTIFFS
Because HFCS plaintiffs must directly trace their adverse health outcome to
consuming foods made with the defendant’s product, a major hurdle to recovery will
be identifying which of several HFCS manufacturers is the actual maker of the
HFCS that caused their type 2 diabetes. 214 Proof of causation, however, is
particularly difficult when some, but not all, of the HFCS manufactured by the
defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury. 215
Fortunately, some courts relax the requirement that plaintiffs prove exactly who
caused their injury by adopting legal doctrines 216 that impose collective liability on
defendants. 217 At first glance, the market share liability approach appears to be a
potential solution to the inability of plaintiffs to identify which of several defendants
manufactured the HFCS that caused their diabetes. This section argues, however,
that even if plaintiffs can establish a causal relationship between HFCS and type 2
diabetes, the circumstances that typically warrant a remedy under this doctrine are
absent in the case of HFCS litigation.
A. The Market Share Liability Approach
First utilized by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 218 market share liability allows plaintiffs to recover damages when
they can identify a group of defendants engaged in the harmful conduct, but cannot

214 Tracing diabetes to a specific manufacturer’s HFCS is inherently problematic because
consumers have difficulty remembering what they eat. Plaintiffs would have to be able to
recall what specific food items they ate, its brand name, and the quantity of the product they
consumed. Additionally, plaintiffs’ dietary recall is influenced by their current diet and
inherently biased because they are parties to a lawsuit attempting to prove causation. See id.
215

Id. at 870.

216

There are several other legal doctrines whereby multiple defendants are held
collectively liable for causing a plaintiff’s injuries. One approach that may provide HFCS
plaintiffs a remedy is the doctrine of “enterprise liability,” which was first enunciated in Hall
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). This theory is broadly
used to mean that losses caused by an enterprise should be borne by it. Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 928 n. 9 (Cal. 1980) (citing Howard C. Klemme, Enterprise
Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976)). Another approach for
assigning collective liability emerged in the case of Summers v. Tice, which imposed the
burden of identifying the cause of the plaintiff’s injury on multiple defendants. Summers v.
Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948); see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 59, at § 1921 (“When the
plaintiff presents evidence that she suffered a single or indivisible injury at the hands of two or
more tortfeasors, the burden is on the party who seeks to avoid responsibility for the entire
damages to prove that magnitude of divisible damages.”).
217

See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937 (holding that if defendants could not prove that they did not
make the DES liability for damages would be apportioned based on market share); Ausness,
supra note 209, at 870; Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of
Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 159 (2004).
218

Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.

300

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 28:264

prove which defendant is responsible for their injury. 219 Under this theory, a
plaintiff who is unable to identify the manufacturer of the particular HFCS that
caused his or her diabetes can still recover on a proportional basis from each of the
defendant manufacturers that may have supplied the HFCS. 220
In Sindell, daughters allegedly injured by their mothers’ ingestion of
diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy brought suit against DES manufacturers
claiming that the drug caused their vaginal and cervical cancers. 221 Prior lawsuits
seeking to hold DES manufacturers responsible for the product’s carcinogenic
effects were unsuccessful because plaintiffs could not identify the manufacturer of
the drug prescribed to their mothers. 222 Therefore, the issue confronting the court in
Sindell was whether a plaintiff, who cannot identify the specific manufacturer of the
responsible product, may hold a manufacturer of a chemically identical drug liable
for her injuries. 223
Recognizing that the plaintiffs would be barred from recovery altogether if the
court rigidly adhered to prior precedent, the court created a remedy for cases of
creation of fungible goods whose source cannot be traced to a specific
manufacturer. 224 Unless it could demonstrate that it could not have made the DES
that caused the plaintiff’s injuries, the court apportioned damages among DES
manufacturers in proportion to its respective market share at the relevant time. 225
219

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. p (2010);
Rostron, supra note 217, at 158; COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE 24 (Sheila A.M. McLean ed.,
1993) (“By this principle, all those who manufactured the generic product may be held
responsible for the defect . . . They are not absolved from liability simply because a particular
plaintiff cannot identify a particular defendant.”).
220 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. p
(2010). Market share liability is an extension of the court’s holding in the famous case of
Summers v. Tice, which held that if a party cannot identify which of two or more joint
tortfeasors caused a plaintiff’s injury, the burden of proof may shift to the defendant to
demonstrate that they were not responsible for the harm. Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
221

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 927–28 (Cal. 1980).

222

Id. at 927–28.

223

Id. at 925. DES manufacturers had to utilize a standard chemical formula for DES
outlined in the United States Pharmacopoeia. Id. at 933.
224 Id. at 936–37. When a product is fungible, market-share liability is appealing because it
provides compensatory relief to plaintiffs and deters future tortious conduct by defendants.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. p
(2010). “If plaintiffs can demonstrate that the marketing and sale of a product was tortious
and that the product caused their harm, they have a strong claim for compensation. Id. This
approach also serves as a deterrent because it imposes liability on the manufacturers of
harmful products, even when a long latency period makes identification of the responsible
manufacturer impossible. Id.
225 Id. at 937. For a discussion of a new proportional liability doctrine that addresses the
legal hurdles to recovery for latent diseases caused by diffused environmental hazards see
Kenneth S. Abraham, Robert L. Rabin & Paul C. Walker, Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury: Further Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333 (1993). Under this approach,
“in any case relying on epidemiological proof of causation, proportional liability rules [rather
than] traditional all-or-nothing liability rules, would apply.” Id. at 355. The authors proposed
that proportional liability rules would apply when epidemiological evidence demonstrates at
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B. Sindell’s “Fungibility” Requirement As a Barrier to Recovery
Courts since Sindell, however, have limited the reach of the market share
approach by confining its applicability to cases where the product in question is
“fungible,” such that “every unit of the product poses an identical degree of risk.” 226
Because market share liability is premised on the notion that identical products pose
identical risks of harm, the lack of fungibility of a product is often used to bar
plaintiffs from recovery. 227
In the case of HFCS litigation, the fungibility requirement articulated under
Sindell, precludes a court from using market share data to allocate liability among
manufacturers that do not necessarily produce chemically identical HFCS. In an
effort to vary the sweetness of their product, manufacturers began altering the
fructose content of its HFCS. There are two types of HFCS currently used in food
products: HFCS-42 and HFCS-55, each named according to its respective proportion
of fructose. 228 Hence, HFCS-42 is 42% fructose. 229 If a dose-response relationship
exists between increasing fructose consumption and negative health effects, the risk
of adverse health outcomes will vary depending upon the specific concentration of

least a twenty percent probability of causation and “damages be proportional to causation up
the point when the probability is at least eighty percent . . . that the defendant’s action caused
the injury in question.” Id. Consequently, victims who were exposed to an environmental
hazard need not prove that it was at least 51% likely that their exposure caused their disease.
Id. at 353. Rather, if the causal likelihood of exposure, as determined by epidemiological
studies, was 35%, then victims would be awarded only 35% of their losses. See id.
226

Rostron, supra note 217, at 153.

227 Id. at 153–54; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
HARM § 28 (2010).

FOR

PHYSICAL

AND

EMOTIONAL

When market-share liability is limited to fungible products that pose equivalent risks
to users who have no reasonable means to prove which manufacturer provided the
product that caused the plaintiff’s harm, it has an exceedingly limited reach . . . Only
products that cause harm after a lengthy latency period between exposure and
development of harm are likely to create the systemic proof problems that marketshare liability addresses.
Id. Additional factors in Sindell that augured in favor of relaxing the traditional
causation requirements were the egregious actions of DES manufacturers and the
circumstances of the plaintiffs’ injuries that rendered identification of a specific
manufacturer impossible by either party. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607
P.2d 924, 925–26 (Cal. 1980). DES Manufacturers knew or should have known of
the dangers, manufacturers failed to test DES for efficacy and safety, failed to warn
consumers of potential carcinogenic effects, and marketed DES on an unlimited
basis without authorization from the Food and Drug Administration. Id.

228 Bray et al., supra note 23, at 537 (describing two different types of HFCS—HFCS-42
(42% fructose) and HFCS-55 (55% fructose)—made by enzymatic isomerization of glucose to
fructose); see also Corn Refiners Association, What is HFCS?, SWEET SURPRISE,
http://sweetsurprise.com/what-is-hfcs (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (“[HFCS], a sugar made
from corn, comes in two compositions–HFCS-42 and HFCS-55.”).
229

Corn Refiners Association, supra note 228.
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fructose used in the defendant’s product. 230 However, because food and beverage
manufacturers are not required to specify which variety of HFCS they used in their
products, it is difficult to determine whether HFCS manufacturers subject consumers
to equal health risks. 231
Furthermore, fundamental differences between HFCS and DES preclude a court
from using market share liability in the context of HFCS litigation. A major
difference between the two is that, unlike DES, HFCS’s ability to cause harm is not
as easily defined because it is one of many ingredients that comprise certain food
products. This is especially true where HFCS, with its differing fructose
concentrations, is present in food in varying quantities and inconsistently consumed.
DES, however, was a single product, manufactured according to a single industry
wide formula, ingested by women within the narrowly defined time frame of
pregnancy, and responsible for a particular type of cancer. 232 Because DES posed an
equivalent risk of harm, irrespective of its particular manufacturer, the court in
Sindell was more willing to find that a reasonable approximation of a defendant’s
liability was its proportion of the market share. 233
Even if HFCS plaintiffs could establish that the nature of their disease rendered
identification of a particular HFCS manufacturer impossible, because HFCS is not
chemically identical and because there is no available means to determine which
HFCS-variety a manufacturer produced, courts cannot utilize the market share
liability approach to provide them a remedy.
VIII. ISSUES OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY LIE AT
THE HEART OF FOOD LAWSUITS

A. Food Litigation as the New Tobacco
Before obesity and its associated health consequences grabbed the nation’s
attention, tobacco use was a major public health concern. Recent lawsuits against
the fast food industry, such as Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., are reminiscent of
tobacco litigation. 234 Both include a personal responsibility component, allegations
that the industries targeted their advertising to children, and the possibility that food

230 Indeed, current scientific evidence lends support to the notion that a dose-response
relationship exists between fructose concentration in HFCS and negative health effects. See
Bray et al., supra note 23, at 537 (finding that the increased consumption of soft drinks and
concomitant increase in fructose intake from HFCS and sucrose may be an important
contributor to the obesity epidemic).
231 See id. at 540 (“HFCS is found in most processed foods; however . . . exact
compositions are not available from either the manufacturer or any publicly available food
composition table.”).
232

See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926.

233

Id. at 937.

234

For a more in-depth discussion of the parallels between fast food and tobacco litigation,
see generally Joshua Logan Pennel, Big Food’s Trip Down Tobacco Road: What Tobacco’s
Past Can Indicate About Food’s Future, 27 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2008–2009).
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manufacturers, like “Big Tobacco,” knew of the dangers of their products, yet
continued to market them. 235
These striking similarities may help assess whether future juries will assign
liability to food manufacturers when consumers suffer obesity-related injuries. 236
Early tobacco cases faced initial skepticism from the public, who believed that any
negative health effects from tobacco use were the result of a lack of self-control. 237
Similarly, food plaintiffs today face the all too familiar argument of personal
responsibility. 238
Lawsuits such as S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. reveal that issues of
personal autonomy and public accountability affect all food consumers. 239 However,
the idea that HFCS manufacturers should be held strictly liable for causing diabetes
may not be one that society is ready to accept because it is contrary to societal
attitudes regarding individual liberty and personal responsibility. 240 These principles
reflect the belief that individuals are free to make their own food choices and must
take responsibility for the consequences of their actions. 241 In other words, allowing
consumers to blame the food industry for the results of their own bad judgment
unfairly shifts responsibility from the individual to the manufacturer. 242
235 Cohan, supra note 202, at 110–13; FAULT LINES, supra note 111, at 103–04 (arguing
that food litigation followed anti tobacco strategists’ three most effective substantive claims:
1) inadequate disclosure of nutritional content; 2) marketing aimed at impressionable children;
and 3) increasing public costs of healthcare due to obesity related conditions); see generally
Jada J. Fehn, The Assault on Bad Food: Tobacco-Style Litigation As An Element of the
Comprehensive Scheme to Fight Obesity, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 65, 72–76 (2012) (noting the
similarity between tobacco and food litigation).
236 Cohan, supra note 202, at 110. Cigarettes have been successfully recast in a negative
light by the “truth campaign,” the largest anti-tobacco movement focused on young people.
KESSLER, supra note 175, at 247. The campaign promoted the notion that a person’s desire for
cigarettes did not come from the individual themselves, but rather from a “manipulative and
profit-driven industry.” Id. The success of this campaign suggests the possibility that
consumers could be willing to hold the food industry responsible for obesity related
conditions. See id. at 247.
237

See Fehn, supra note 235, at 73.

238 Id. at 75. The theory of “conditioned hypereating,” proposed by David Kessler, calls
into question the idea that individuals truly have a choice in what they consume. KESSLER,
supra note 175, at 145. Kessler posits “chronic exposure to highly palatable foods changes
our brains, conditioning us to seek continued stimulation. Over time, [the brain develops a
powerful urge] for a combination of sugar, fat, and salt, [which] competes with our conscious
capacity to say no.” Id.
239

See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

240

See Ausness, supra note 209, at 887.

241

Id. The importance of moderation and avoidance of excessive food intake dates back to
the Old Testament, in which God specifically warns against the sin of gluttony. See Proverbs
23:2 (New Int’l Version) (“[P]ut a knife to your throat if you are given to gluttony.”); see also
Proverbs 23:20–21 (New Int’l Version) (“Do not join those who drink too much wine or
gorge themselves on meat, for drunkards and gluttons become poor, and drowsiness clothes
them in rags.”).
242 This argument, however, becomes less applicable when the injured plaintiffs are
children. Children and teenagers do not possess the requisite maturity to understand the
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Despite increasing rates of obesity, the notion of personal responsibility still
pervades the public mockery of food lawsuits and underscores legislative attempts
seeking to hold Americans accountable for what they eat. 243
B. Legislative Attempts to Curb Food Litigation
Recognizing that litigation is a major threat to their industry, food manufacturers
lobbied members of Congress to introduce legislation that immunized them from
liability. 244 The Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005
prevented civil liability actions brought against food manufacturers, marketers,
distributors, advertisers, sellers, and trade associations for claims of injury related to
an individual’s weight gain, obesity, or any health condition related to such. 245 The
Act asserted that a person’s weight gain, obesity, or obesity-related health condition
is based on a multitude of factors such that it cannot be attributed to the consumption
of any particular food product or beverage. 246 It also recognized that “lawsuits
seeking to blame food and beverage providers for a person’s weight gain, obesity, or

consequences of their eating habits. KAUFMAN, supra note 42, at 219–20. Consequently, they
are more susceptible to the aggressive tactics that food manufacturers use to market their
products. Fehn, supra note 235, at 69–70; KAUFMAN, supra note 42, at 219-20; KILLER AT
LARGE: WHY OBESITY IS AMERICA’S GREATEST THREAT (ShineBox Media Prod. 2008)
(suggesting that junk food marketing to children undermines parental authority to determine
what their children consume and is a contributory factor to the growing rise in obesity among
America’s youth). Junk food marketing is a two billion dollar a year effort by the food
industry to create brand loyalty among the nation’s young teens and children. TEDxTalks,
Marketing Food to Children: Anna Lappe at TEDxManhattan, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2003),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bop3D7-dDM. The food industry seeks to create brand
loyalty at a young age because it knows that this loyalty ultimately generates “pester power,”
which works. Id. In fact, 75% of parents reported that they bought something for the first
time simply because their children asked them to. Id. Juries will be more likely to assign
blame to food sellers when children develop obesity-related health problems associated with
the consumption of their products. Alderman & Daynard, supra note 45, at 85 (“Because
children are more vulnerable than adults due to their lower capacity to evaluate advertising
objectively, the food industry may be especially vulnerable to claims about misleading
advertising directed toward children.”).
243 See Shirleen Holt, Go Ahead, Splurge on The Bulge, But Any Resulting Fact Is On You,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/977597/posts; see infra Part VII(B). Diners at Seattle’s 5 Spot restaurant must sign a
waiver promising not to file a lawsuit for any weight gain associated with consuming “The
Bulge,” a calorie-dense “concoction of sugar-coated fried banana, ice cream, macadamia nuts,
whipped cream and two kinds of syrup.” Holt, supra at A1. The waiver states in relevant
part, “I promise to release the 5 Spot from all liability of any weight gain that may result from
ordering and devouring this sinfully fattening treat. If I have to go to ‘fat camp’ at some time
in my life, I will not mail my bill to the 5 Spot.”
Id.

244

KAUFMAN, supra note 42, at 220.

245

Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. §
2(a) (2005).
246

Id. at § 2(a)(3).
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a health condition . . . are not only legally frivolous and economically damaging, but
also harmful to a healthy America.” 247
Despite being reintroduced three times, the federal Personal Responsibility in
Food Consumption Act failed to gain enough Congressional support. 248 Undaunted,
the National Restaurant Association, representing large food chains such as
McDonald’s, has successfully lobbied state legislatures to pass various
“commonsense consumption” laws. 249 These laws, dubbed “Cheeseburger Bills,”
bar civil lawsuits against food manufacturers seeking recovery for obesity-related
Between 2004 and 2012, twenty-five states enacted
health conditions. 250
Cheeseburger Bills. 251
Although HFCS litigants may still bring obesity related tort claims against HFCS
manufacturers in federal court, the enactment of “Commonsense Consumption” laws
by over twenty-five states demonstrates how organized lobbying efforts, huge
financial incentives, 252 and an increasingly “receptive legislative climate” can
effectively shield the food industry from liability. 253

247

Id. at § 2(a)(4).

248

Melanie Warner, The Food Industry Empire Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at
CI,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/07/business/07food.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
249 Id.
As recently as July 18, 2013, North Carolina enacted its Commonsense
Consumption Act, barring civil actions against food and beverage manufacturers from claims
arising from weight gain, obesity, its associated health conditions, or other conditions likely to
result from long-term consumption of food. Commonsense Consumption Act, H.B. 683, 2013
Gen. Assemb. § 99E-42 (N.C. 2013). The Act also prohibits local governments from
regulating the size of soft drinks offered for sale. Id.
250 Cara L. Wilking & Richard A. Daynard, Beyond Cheeseburgers: The Impact of
Commonsense Consumption Acts on Future Obesity-Related Lawsuits, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
229, 230 (2013).
251 Id. Notably, fifteen of the twenty-five states with the highest obesity rates have enacted
Commonsense Consumption Acts. Id.
252 Warner, supra note 248 (“[T]he food and restaurant industry gave a total of $5.5 million
to politicians in the 20 states that have passed laws shielding companies from obesity
liability.”).
253 Id.; see generally Wilking & Daynard, supra note 250, at 230. Boehmer and colleagues
investigated state-level childhood obesity prevention legislation in order to analyze
geographic patterns of bill introduction and adoption. Tegan K. Boehmer, et al., Patterns of
Childhood Obesity Prevention Legislation in the United States, 4 PREVENTING CHRONIC
DISEASE
1,
3–4
(July
2007),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2007/jul/pdf/06_0082.pdf. During the three-year study period,
17% of the 717 introduced bills, which related to childhood obesity prevention topics, were
adopted by the fifty states. Id. at 3. None of these adopted bills, however, sought to hold the
food industry responsible. See id. Those bills relating to snack and soda taxes, restaurant
menu, and product labeling were not adopted by any state legislature. Id.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The New York District Court’s ruling in the current HFCS lawsuit will set the
stage for future food litigation and will determine if courts are willing to accept the
legal theory that food manufacturers should be held liable for the adverse health
outcomes associated with their food products.
Liability is contingent upon plaintiffs proving causation. In order to demonstrate
that an exposure or product caused their adverse health outcome, plaintiffs are
increasingly relying on epidemiologic evidence. Strict interpretations of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert, erect seemingly insurmountable barriers to
admitting an expert opinion based on epidemiologic evidence. Bright-line tests,
such as a risk ratio threshold of 2.0, do not reflect how practitioners derive causal
inferences in the field and usually result in the dismissal of otherwise meritorious
claims. Instead of utilizing these arbitrary admissibility tests, judges should
determine the reliability of epidemiologic evidence by examining the methodology
behind each study.
Unfortunately, even if HFCS plaintiffs succeeded in establishing causation,
additional barriers, such as apportioning liability and the battle cry of personal
responsibility, likely stand in their way. According to law professor and antitobacco litigator, John Banzhaf III, “as was the case with tobacco, it takes time for
legal theories to coalesce in a way that forces major societal change.” 254 Indeed, the
line between individual responsibility and public accountability for the economic
and public health costs of obesity-related health conditions, has yet to be firmly
drawn in the context of food litigation. 255 S.F. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. may
254 Blaine Harden, Eatery Joins Battle with The Bulge, GUARDIAN WKLY., Sept. 24, 2003,
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2003/sep/25/guardianweekly.guardianweekly11.
Following the passage of local laws in New York and California banning trans fat in
restaurants in 2006 and 2008, respectively, “[o]n [November 7, 2013], the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) announced that it is beginning the process of eliminating artificial trans
fat from the U.S. food supply.” Alexandra Sifferlin, Trimming the Fat: A New FDA Effort
Could Change Junk Food–For the Better, TIME, Nov. 25, 2013, at 21. Health statistics, such
as the Center for Disease Control’s estimate that trans fat contributes to 20,000 heart attacks
each year, “prompted the FDA to declare that trans fats are no longer ‘generally recognized as
safe.’” Id. Acknowledging that it took seven years to mandate disclosure of trans fat on food
labels, this ban does not mean that trans fat will disappear from store shelves tomorrow. Id.
Indeed, because this ban would require many businesses to completely reformulate their food
production, the FDA is offering a 60-day “commenting period” for food industry advocates to
suggest a more realistic timeframe. Id. Although it may take years before trans fat disappears
for good, the FDA’s newest effort to curb the obesity epidemic is a step in the right direction.
Id.
255 See Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (“The issue of determining the breadth of personal
responsibility underlies much of the law: where should the line be drawn between an
individual’s own responsibility to take care of herself, and society’s responsibility to ensure
that others shield her?”). Entitled, “YOU ARE TOO STUPID…to make good personal
decisions about foods and beverages,” the Center for Consumer Freedom’s ad that was
launched in response to the New York City Department of Health’s campaign encouraging
consumers to choose beverages with less sugar, illustrates the current battle between personal
responsibility and industry accountability. You are Too Stupid, CENTER FOR CONSUMER
FREEDOM (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.consumerfreedom.com/2011/12/you-are-too-stupid/;
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just be one battle in the greater war to hold the food industry responsible for the
nation’s expanding waistline and its attendant health consequences.
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